Missouri Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 2 April 1959

Article 4

1959

Editorial Board/Comments

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Editorial Board/Comments , 24 MO. L. REV. (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

et al.: Editorial Board/Comments

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Published in January, April, June, and November by the
School of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

Volume 24

APRIL 1959

Number 2

If a subscriber wishes his subscription to the REvIEw discontinued at its expiration, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise it is assumed that a continuation
is desired.
Subscription Price $2.50 per volume

$1.00 per current number

MEMBER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAW REVIEWS

EDITORIAL BOARD
WM. DOUGLAS KILBOURN, JR., Faculty Editor
STUDENTS
JAMES WILLIAM ROBERTS, Editor-in-Chief

MELVIN E. CARNAHAN, Comment Editor
GUSTAV J. LEHR, Note Editor
JOHN E. BuRRuSS, JR.
WILLIAM C. KELLY
DONALD E. CHANEY
ANDREW H. LAFORCE, II
JOHN C. CROW
TROY RICHARD MAGER
LARRY D. DINGUS
HARRY D. PENER
CHARLES B. ERICKSON
JAMES K. PREWITT
WILLIAM J. ESELY
JOHN D. RAHOY
JACK E. EVANS
JAMES WM. RINER
CHARLES B. FAULKNER
BERNARD FRANK
TED M. HENSON

JOHN WM. RINGER
B. VINCENT TYNDALL
M. RANDALL VANET

E. MITCHELL HOUGH

JULIUS F. WALL

BOBBY J. KEETER

JAMES R. WILLARD

ESTHER MASON, Business Manager

Publication of signed contributions does not signify adoption of the views
expressed by the REVIEW or its Editors collectively.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by
because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which
have in them the gern of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of the law.'--OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEcAL PAPERS 269 (1920).

Comments
ARREST IN MISSOURI BY THE USE OF RADAR SPEEDMETERS
Shortly after the turn of the decade, an interesting and perhaps ominous creature
made its debut into law enforcement in our nation. The device is not unknown to

those engaged in work with the military, aviation and shipping; however it is
(196)
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certainly an innovation in a court of law. Law enforcement agencies have found
it a boon in detecting speed violators, and have engaged in using it to a wide extent.'
The objections which come with the introduction into law enforcement of any new
and untried scientific device are many, and this device has certainly found no
exception to that general rule.
The name of the device is "Radio Ranging and Detection," or more popularly,
radar. Since the radar unit has been introduced into law enforcement, it has met
with a constant battle for recognition in the courts on what seems to be a case of
desirability of law enforcement in the strict sense on the one hand versus adherence
to strict rules of evidence and the desirability of the human element of judgment
in law enforcement on the other hand. Opposition to the use of the device has been
stringent in the contested cases, and perhaps as stringent in feeling in those cases
in which the criminal defendant found it unprofitable to contest the case and paid a
fine under the state of mind which accompanied the abolished plea of nolo contendere.
Although this Comment is being written for publication in Missouri it is incumbent that cases from other jurisdictions be cited, as at the time of writing no
Missouri case has been decided at the reported (appellate) level. However, it seems
fair to assume that when the problem is presented in the Missouri courts, the general
trend of the decisions of other jurisdictions will be followed and certainly must
be called upon for authority for both the prosecution and the defense.
From the reported cases, it appears that the device used in all jurisdictions is
the same in principle, and possibly of the same manufacture. Therefore, the
questions involved should not materially differ in Missouri as far as the accuracy
of the device is involved, although the rules of evidence and arrest will be peculiar
to the law of this state.
Perhaps the explanation for the dearth of authority on this subject in Missouri
is found in the fact that a state speed law has not existed until very recently. 2
Although many municipalities in this state have long employed this device to
enforce ordinances relating to speed, the use of the device upon the state highways
is relatively new. It may well be that the bringing of the original proceeding in a
state court rather than a municipal court will result in appellate cases on this
subject which otherwise would not have been carried to them.
In the main, it may be stated that there appear to be four basic issues involved
in the conviction of a defendant for speed violation detected by use of radar:
1. The accuracy of the device as a class of scientific instruments.
2. The accuracy of the particular device or unit used to detect the violation of
this particular defendant. This may be called "functioning" of the radar unit
at the time of the arrest.

1. Over 500 police departments in 43 states are using it. Comment, 23 TENN. L.
REv. 784 (1955).
2. § 304.010, RSMo 1957 Supp.
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3. The identification of the defendant as the speed violator in question.
4. Hearsay evidence, as it may relate to testing and setting the unit up, to
identification, and to the arrest of the defendant.
The reported cases to date will be discussed in the order in which they may
bear upon these four questions. Undoubtedly, there will be some "seeping through"
as the issues are by their nature very closely interrelated to the entire picture.
AccuRAcy
In accordance with the rules of evidence governing untested scientific devices,
the earlier cases which were permitted to stand all contain testimony of the electronic
and mechanical principles of the radar instrument itself. In most of these cases,
the expert testimony was given by the same individual, Dr. John M. Kopper. This
man's ability to qualify as an expert in the field is undisputable, in view of his
experience with devices of this type, and his general experience and ability in the
electronics area.3 In brief, his explanation may be somewhat paraphrased as follows:
The transmitter component of the instrument casts a beam in the path of the
oncoming vehicle. The beam consists of microwaves at the frequency of 2455
megacycles per second. The vehicle becomes the beam's target. The beam strikes
or Illuminates the target, and in turn, is reflected or echoed back to the receiver
part of the mechanism. The frequency of the waves so returning is different from
the frequency of the waves originally transmitted. The faster the target approaches
the radar device, within the zone of influence, the higher this difference between
the two frequencies. Upon reaching the receiver, the returning waves mIx with a
portion of the energy radiated from the transmitter. This mixture creates a phenomenon called "beats." This phenomenon is analogous to that of beats in music,
where, upon simultaneously striking two adjacent keys on a piano, the combined
tones develop greater definition and intensity, resulting in an alternate rising and
falling or throbbing of sound identified as such "beats."
It is to be inferred from Dr. Kopper's explanation that just as "beats" occur
with combined sound waves of different frequencies, so can they also occur with
intermingled radio or light waves of different frequencies. The number of such
radio beats per second is equal to the difference between the frequency of the
waves transmitted and that of the waves received; the said number of beats being
directly proportional to the velocity of the target vehicle. Accordingly, the radar
device has as its primary function, the measurement of the mentioned difference
of the said frequencies, or the computation of the number of beats per second.
Ultimately, the measurement is made in the form of an electrical quantity in terms
of electrical current; the current being directly related to the number of beats. A

3. "Dr. Kopper has been on the staff of The Johns Hopkins University since
1937, and currently is serving in two capacities: (1) Research Scientist in the Radiation Laboratory; (2) Research Contract Director of various research projects."
Kopper, Symposium: Radar Speedmeters--The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters, 3a N.C.L. Rav. 343 biog. note (1955).
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scale can be made for such measurement and affixed to the radar apparatus, so as
to translate the number of beats per second into miles per hour. In fine, the radar
speedmeter is a "beat" or "pulse" frequency meter with its readings given in miles
4
per hour instead of in beats per second.
Perhaps to the novice in electronics, it is easier to think of this mechanical
operation in terms of the so-called Doppler effect. We have all noticed the difference in frequency of sound as we approach an oncoming auto with its horn sounding.
As it approaches, the frequency of the sound seems to increase, as is noticed by
the pitch of the horn becoming higher; as it passes, we notice an immediate drop in
the pitch of the sound. The faster the car approaches, the more noticeable the effect.
The radio waves of the radar react in the same way, with the receiver serving the
function of the ear, measuring the intensity of the change of frequency, and calibrating this change into miles per hour on a dial which is observed by the operator.5
It is understandable that the first attack in court of the use of radar would
include, if not be based in toto, on the contention that the device is inaccurate and
incapable of measuring the speed of the defendant's car. In the first reported case,
State v. MoffittG such a contention was made. An expert appeared for the state and
testified to the operation of the radar unit. The court instructed the jury that this
device, as explained, was of the type that they might find accurate in the measurement of moving vehicles, if found to be properly functioning at the time of the
arrest.
Next, and shortly thereafter, a series of New York cases were reported, and seem
to be the cornerstone in this field of the law. The first of these is People v. Offernann.7 Although there are many interesting aspects of this case, only that dealing
with the accuracy problem will be discussed at this point. The trial judge stated
that he had personal knowledge of the accuracy of the device, as he and others in
his car had tested it on location. Additionally, the radio technician of the police
department was permitted to testify as an expert on the accuracy of the device. On
appeal, it was held that the personal knowledge of the lower court so acquired did
not come within the scope of judicial knowledge, and further, that the radio technician of the police department was not qualified as an expert in the field of electronics.
The conviction was reversed.
In People v. Torpeys no expert testimony was offered as to the functioning of
the device. The court sustained a conviction of the defendant on the testimony
of the officers that in their opinions the defendant was speeding, independent

4. This statement of operation is taken almost bodily from People v. Nasella,
3 Misc. 2d 418, 422-23, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469-70 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
5. For the most detailed and complete description of the mechanics of the
device that has been found, and that is cited in the cases, see Kopper, Symposium:
Radar Speedneters--The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters, 33 N.C.L. Rv.
343 (1955).
6. 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (Super. Ct. 1953).
7. 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
8. 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County Ct. 1953).
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of the radar evidence. The court stated that the radar evidence would not be
sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction, but was admissible to be weighed
with the officers' estimates. The court points out that until such time as the courts
recognize radar equipment as a method of accurately measuring the speed of automobiles, in those cases in which the law authorities rely solely upon the speed
indicator of the radar equipment, it will be necessary to establish by expert testimony
the accuracy of radar for the purpose of measuring speed.
The theory that an expert witness would be necessary if the state relied solely
upon the radar unit for speed violation was supported in People v. Katz,') a case
arising in a different New York jurisdiction a few months after the decision In
the Torpey case. There it was held that radar evidence when explained by an
expert (Dr. Kopper) is sufficient, without more, for establishing a speed violation.
In People v. Sarver' a hint at judicial notice of the accuracy of the device was
made, but the court was working with a case in which Dr. Kopper had testified as
an expert. In this case, Dr. Kopper testified that the device was within one to two
miles per hour accurate. The court held the evidence admissible in this case, but
could not base its holding upon the radar evidence as the arresting officer had
sworn out the complaint against the defendant on the hearsay information supplied
to him by the radar officer, which forced the court again to rely upon the estimated
speed testimony of the officers involved.' I
Another case in the same court as the Offermann case again met with difficulty.
In City of Buffalo v. Beck' 2 the trial court took judicial notice of the accuracy of
the radar unit, stating that the Doppler effect was recognized as being used. The
court on appeal said:
The taking of judicial notice complained of by the appellant was not proper
and the court below erred in so doing. The court failed to consider wellrecognized rules which permit a trier of the facts to take judicial notice of
what otherwise would require proof. The essence of judicial notice is that
the trier of the facts, whether he be judge or juror, will assume as true for
the purpose of the case before him, certain facts without requiring proof
thereof. The fundamental justification for this legal phenomenon is that the
trier of the facts possesses in common with the public, knowledge of facts
of common occurrence and notoriety.1
I must hold that the theory of the operation of this electrically operated
device and the accuracy of its measurement of speed is not a proper subject
for judicial notice at this time. Electronics is a recent development in the
science embracing the mysteries of electricity. Certainly it cannot be said
that such knowledge is 'notorious' as above described or that it is 'the general

9.
10.
11.
Goes to
12.
13.

205 Misc. 522, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954).
205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954).
For a somewhat different interpretation of People v. Sarver,see Baer, Radar
Court, 33 N.C.L. REv. 355, 376 (1955).
205 Misc. 757, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Id. at 758-59, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
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knowledge of the'country' nor is the operation of this device 'a practical
application of scientific facts which are generally known or ought to be
14
knowVn.'
The court then reversed as the record did not disclose whether the trial court relied
upon the radar evidence or upon the testimony of the police officers of independent
evidence of speed.' 5
State v. Dantonio, a New Jersey case, is perhaps the most frequently cited case
in this field. There are two reported decisions on this case, one at the appellate
level' 6 and one in the Supreme Court of New Jersey.1 7 The case is extremely
interesting as the defendant bus driver was operating a vehicle which was equipped
with a "tachograph," an instrument which records the speed of the bus permanently
on a graph for later inspection by the company. Dr. Kopper testified for the prosecution and the defense countered with expert testimony on the accuracy of the
,tachograph. The graph from the tachograph indicated that the bus had not exceeded
61 miles per hour on the trip in question, yet the defendant was charged with
travelling 66 miles per hour. Later, the same bus using the same tachograph was
run through the same radar unit, and both recorded identical speeds. Both courts
upheld the conviction on the basic theory that the accuracy of the devices was a
question for the trier of the facts, and it had been resolved against the tachograph
in favor of the radar unit. Other elements in the case made affirmance easy, for
there was some discrepancy in the testimony of the expert on the tachograph plus
the defendant's own admission of the length of time it took him to travel a certain
distance on this particular trip which indicated that he must have been speeding
at some point, for his overall average including stops was very near the 60 mile
per hour speed limit.
Additionally the court held that expert testimony would no longer be necessary
on the part of the prosecution in a radar speed case, although it was here present.
This is the first holding by a high court that expert testimony as to the operation
and construction of the radar unit will not be necessary in the future.
In People v. Sachs' 8 a lower New York court holds that expert testimony will
not be necessary in the future, after hearing testimony by Dr. Kopper on the design
of the instrument. However, the court is careful to lay out certain rules as to the
"functioning" of the unit which must be proven in each case and will not be
judicially recognized.
Until this time all the cases at the reported level were in the eastern states.
Perhaps it will be well to discuss the two additional cases from that area, although
somewhat out of order in point of time.

14. Id. at 760, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
15. Compare this with People v. Torpey, supra note 8, where the court held
the radar evidence admissible as additional evidence of speed, under similar circumstances.
16. 31 N.J. Super. 105, 105 A.2d 918 (1954).
17. State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
18. 1 Misc. 2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Magis. Ct. 1955).
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People v. Nasella' 9 found Dr. Kopper on the witness stand for the prosecution
again. The court held this would not be necessary in the future, saying that the time
is here to dispense with the necessity of expert testimony and that even though
this places speed contest cases on the basis of man v. machine, the scientific facts
of the accuracy cannot be disputed. The court however lays great emphasis on
the necessity of a properly functioning unit.
In People v. Magri2o no expert appeared. The court held that this was proper,
taking judicial notice of the accuracy of the radar unit as a class of scientific instruments. Thus the long battle was won.
There appear to be two decisions on this subject from the Supreme Court of
Nebraska. The first, Dietze v. State2 l involved a Greyhound bus which was
saddled with a governor on the engine, designed to permit a maximum of 1900
revolutions per minute, calculated to permit a maximum speed of 60 miles per hour.
The defendant was given a summons for travelling 70 miles per hour. At the trial,
on the accuracy point no objection was made to the introduction of the radar
evidence without expert proof and testimony. It was held that this issue could not
be raised for the first time on appeal. The appellate court did hold, however, that
since some of the obvious functional characteristics of the device were offered in
evidence by the prosecution, and in view of the cases in other jurisdictions, it would
not reverse on the accuracy point. It appears that this court is willing to waive
expert testimony as to accuracy of the class of instruments, or at least it may be
said that its decision has this result. The case was reversed on the grounds of
prejudice of the trial judge.
The second Nebraska case, Peterson v. State, 22 again finds the defendant not
complaining of lack of expert testimony as to the accuracy of the class of instruments, but rather merely as to the accuracy of the unit in question. The court holds
that the unit in question was properly functioning and goes on to the defendant's
contention that radar evidence alone is insufficient for conviction. The court fails
to meet this issue squarely and finds that the officers making the arrest did in fact
testify at the trial as to their estimates of the defendant's speed, which was above
the speed limit:
On recross-examination he [the officer] testified that his estimate was based
on his observation of the vehicle and that his opinion was not influenced
23
by the reading made by the speed meter.
Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court of Nebraska will admit radar
evidence, without expert testimony as to the operation of the class of instruments,
so long as there is some testimony as to its functioning. Further, it appears unclear

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

3 Misc. 2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Magis. Ct. 1956).
3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
162 Neb. 80, 75 N.W.2d 95 (1956).
163 Neb. 669, 80 N.W.2d 688 (1957).
Id. at 674, 80 N.W.2d at 692.
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whether Nebraska will permit a conviction to stand if it is based on radar evidence
alone, without testimony from the arresting officers that the defendant was speeding
in their opinion, independent of the evidence presented by reading the radar speedmeter.
One case from the Supreme Court of Tennessee has been reported. In Hardaway v. Tennessee2 4 we again find Dr. Kopper in his usual role as expert for the
prosecution. Although this case presents some interesting points on "functioning"
it differs little on the accuracy question. The court held that in view of the expert
testimony the radar evidence alone would suffice for conviction, and that no estimate
of speed independent of the radar evidence was necessary.
Virginia has seen fit to enact a statute which relieves the prosecution of the
burden of proving the theory of the device by expert testimony in each case.25 This
statute was held constitutional on an attack of due process in Dooley v. Commonwealth26 the court saying that the statute merely provides a presumption of accuracy,
shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant. 27 There
are many other desirable features of this statute which will be discussed below.28
From the foregoing it is seen that New York has actually upheld a case wherein
no expert was offered on the accuracy of the class of instruments, that New Jersey
has authorized dispensing with expert testimony in the future, and that Nebraska
may be said to have done the same. However, even to concede the accuracy of the

24. 302 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1957).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-215.2 (Supp. 1958), which provides:
(a) The speed of any motor vehicle may be checked by the use of radiomicro
waves or other electrical device. The results of such checks shall be accepted
as prima facie evidence of the speed of such motor vehicle in any court or
legal proceedings where the speed of the motor vehicle is at issue.
(b) The driver of any motor vehicle may be arrested without a warrant
under this section provided the officer is in uniform or displays his badge
of authority; provided that such officer has observed the recording of the
speed of such motor vehicle by the radiomicro waves or other electrical
device, or has received a radio message from the officer who observed the
speed of the motor vehicle recorded by the radiomicro waves or other
electrical device; provided in case of an arrest based on such a message that
such radio message has been dispatched immediately after the speed of the
motor vehicle was recorded and furnished a license number of the vehicle
and the recorded speed to the arresting officer.
(c) No operator of a motor vehicle may be arrested under this section unless
signs have been placed at the State line on a primary highway system, and
outside cities and towns having over 3,500 population, on the primary highways to indicate the legal rate of speed and that the speed of motor vehicles
may be measured by radiomicro waves or other electrical devices....
26. 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956).
27. Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 812 (1957), discussed infra,
holds that the Virginia statute does not dispense with the necessity of proving that
the machine has been properly set up and recently tested for accuracy.
28. See also People v. Beamer, 130 Cal. App. 2d 874, 279 P.2d 205 (App. Dep't.
1955) holding that use of the radar device is not prohibited by the California "speed
trap" statute. For a case somewhat out of line with the other authority on this
subject, strongly in favor of prosecution, see State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293
P.2d 399 (1956).
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instrument in general is a far cry from conceding the correctness of the functioning
of a particular instrument on a particular occasion.
FUNCTION3NG
The word "functioning" is employed in this Comment to describe the operational
aspects of the device as it effects the accuracy of the particular unit at the time
used. This necessarily involves the manner in which the device is used, and the
manner in which it is set up and tested prior to such use. Assuming that the
accuracy of the class of instruments has been established, the problem of establishing the accuracy of this particular unit still remains. Although it may have been
tested for accuracy at the place of manufacture, it cannot be assumed that it will
still be accurate a year later, or even a day later, after having been moved from
place to place and after having been subjected to abuse of normal usage.
It is in the area of functioning that real problems arise, and that the defendant
will either be subjected to abuse by the use of the apparatus, or will have his
rights adequately protected. It seems that this cannot be overemphasized, for here
we have man v. machine, a type of justice which may be forthcoming but a type of
justice that must insure to the maximum degree that at least the machine is working
right. The weight of the radar evidence in a jury case is very impressive when
accompanied with testimony of the experts and the arresting officers. The officers
can be expected to be very positive in their statements of accuracy of the unit as
it is logical to assume that they do in fact believe that the speed recorded by it is
correct. However, it may well be that as a result of using the unit for an extended
period of time the officers have come so to rely upon its accuracy that they become
lax in insuring the accuracy of the unit with which they work. It is here that the
courts must seek, and have sought, to protect the defendant from abuse. In this
type of prosecution the court must scrutinize the operation of the machine carefully
to insure that it was properly functioning at the time of the particular arrest. That
it is usually or generally accurate is not proof enough. That it was accurate yesterday or at a different location is not enough. The prosecution must be held to prove
that it was accurate when the defendant was summoned. This problem is particularly pointed up when the defendant is accused of exceeding a speed limit by
only a few miles per hour, in view of Dr. Kopper's testimony that the device "is
within one to two miles per hour accurate" when properly functioning.
The usual method of operating the radar unit is as follows: Two officers in
two vehicles are used. The radar equipment is placed in one vehicle, usually
in a somewhat permanent manner. The vehicle containing the radar equipment.
called the radar car, is placed alongside the street or highway in a normal parking
position or is located in a driveway or convenient side street. The second car and
officers are located a short distance away from the radar car farther down the
roadway. Generally the two units are placed in.such a manner that they are inconspicuous to the motorist. The two vehicles are in communcation with each other by
police radio, and in the better operations are in view of each other. As the violator
passes through the radar unit's zone of influence the radar operator observes the
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speed indicated by the speedmeter and radios the information ahead to the officer
in the pick up car. The officer in the pick up car then stops the motorist and issues a
summons.
The radar car must of course be located in such a manner that the operator can
see the oncoming traffic so as to enable him to determine which vehicle is recording
the speed on the meter. He will know approximately where the target vehicle enters
the zone of influence and where it leaves the zone, this information aiding him in his
identification of the vehicle if in violation. The target vehicle causes the dial on
the radar unit to reflect the speed of the vehicle in miles per hour, the dial appearing
much as the fanilar speedometer in common use in automobiles. Many of the radar
units are also equipped with what is called a graph instrument. The graph paper is
fixed on one spool, and runs or winds onto a blank spool during the period of
operation. As the target vehicle comes through the zone of influence, the speed
thereof is recorded on the graph in ink, the inking arm of the apparatus moving
across the graph from a position of zero to a position on the calibrated graph paper
equivalent to the speed reflected on the dial of the instrument. The desirability of
this feature is readily seen, as it eliminates the element of human error of the
operator in misreading the dial, as the dial returns to zero with the passing of the
target vehicle giving no permanent recordation of the defendant's speed.
Dr. Kopper points out that in his opinion the average policeman can learn to
use the radar speedometer after about one and one-half to two hours of instruction.
He need not know the details of design and construction of the unit any more than he
needs to know those of the speedometer in his patrol car. Assuming that the operator
is sufficiently trained in using the instrument, Dr. Kopper then makes the following
recommendations in the use of the device:
1. Check for accuracy at each location where the unit is used, both before
and after use:
It is important to check the meter for accuracy each time it is set up for use;
if the meter is to be used at two sites in one morning then it should be
checked at each site to avoid the contention that the meter was thrown out
of adjusment during transit. The meter should be checked before the
beginning of the period of observation of a highway and at the end of the
period. In scientific work it is usual to assume that if a given instrument
reads correctly at the beginning and ending of a set of measurements, its
readings during the interval were also correct. The check can be made
by having a car with calibrated speedometer run through the zone of the
meter twice, once at the speed limit for the zone and once at a speed ten or
fifteen miles per hour greater. As the test car goes by the meter the driver
can notify the operator of the meter what his speed is. If the difference
between the speedometer reading and the radar meter is more than two miles
per hour, steps should be taken to see why this is the case and to remedy the
29
matter.

29. Kopper, Symposium: Radar Speedmeters-The Scientific Reliability of Radar
Speedmeters, 33 N.C.L. REv. 343, 353 (1955).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Royals v. Commonwealth30 held that failure
to test the radar unit in the above described manner was fatal to the case for the
prosecution and reversed the conviction of the lower court. In a companion case 31
the same court held that failure to test after the use of the device was also fatal,
although it had been tested at the beginning of the tour. It is interesting to note
that the Virginia court was working under a statute 3 2 stating that the instrument is

prima facie correct. Commenting, the court says:
It [the statute] does not eliminate the necessity for the Commonwealth to
prove that the machine used for measuring speed had been properly set up
3
and recently tested for accuracy.
In People v. Magri evidence was offered that a test had been made in conformity
with the above, but it was excluded on the grounds that the officers who were
operating the device at the time of the recording of defendant's speed were not the
officers who had run the test, and therefor their testimony of the test information was
hearsay. The court upheld the conviction, however, on the testimony of the officers
that in their opinion the defendant was exceeding the speed limit, independent of
the radar information, saying:
Were the only evidence here that of the untested radar equipment, we
would hold, as in the case of an untested automobile speedometer, that such
34
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding.
Two other cases seem worthy of specific comment in this area. The first is
the sole Tennessee case reported. 35 The report recites that evidence of testing was
presented. However, the operation in that case consisted of a single officer, driving
the radar equipped car, doing both the timing and arresting of the violator. From the
report it appears that the officers would pull his radar equipped car to the side of the
road, time vehicles as they drove through the zone of influence, and then pursue and
arrest violators as indicated by the radar equipment. Although the court seems to be
satisfied with the evidence as offered as to testing, it appears that this mode of
operation would not be conducive to the rigid method of testing every time the unit
is moved that has been required by other jurisdictions.
The second unusual case is the sole reported case from the state of Washington.3 0
In this case the defendant contended (on appeal) that sufficient testing had not been
made prior to the use of the equipment. The court took the view that this roadside
testing was unnecessary, for the radar equipment is, according to this court, more
accurate than a speedometer, and any discrepancy between the radar and the speedometer would only indicate that the speedometer in the test car was inaccurate. 37 A

30. 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 812 (1957).
31. Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 883, 96 S.E.2d 816 (1957).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-215.2 (Supp. 1958), quoted supra note 25.
33. 198 Va. at 881, 96 S.E.2d at 816.
34. 3 N.Y.2d at 566-67, 147 N.E.2d at 731, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
35. Hardaway v. Tennessee, 302 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1957).
36. State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293 P.2d 399 (1956).
37. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Ryan case is not cited in later cases in
other jurisdictions.
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dissent is also reported, which states that the roadside test is indispensible and that
the radar evidence should have been excluded. The dissenting judge would have
affirmed the conviction on the ground that the officers testified to a speed violation
independent of the radar evidence. This would have brought the case within the
doctrine of the Magri case.
This raises a problem which seems to be unsettled in many states, involving the
necessity of producing evidence on the accuracy of the speedometer in the test car.
Preliminary research on this question has disclosed no Missouri case in point, and
what may well be termed a dearth of authority in most other states.' s However, it
may be stated the English view on the matter is that the speedometer is accepted as
being prima facie correct""' and this view is followed in at least one American case
involving the testing of radar equipment with the speedometer in question. 4 0 A contrary view does exist, to the effect that testimony of the testing of the automobile
speedometer within a reasonable time prior to the date in quesion is necessary to
render evidence of the reading admissible. In People v. Heyser 4' it is said:
In our opinion, evidence of the reading of an untested speedometer without
more would be insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding."2
The court upheld a conviction in the Heyser case of driving 60 miles per hour in a
40 mile per hour zone, on the officers' estimate of violation of the 40 mile per hour
limit, when the officer had followed the defendant in light traffic for two miles. 43
Dr. Kopper also states that the unit must be placed in such a manner that
vehicles in the opposite lane of traffic will not be detected by the unit, as "the meter
reads the speeds of both oncoming and receding vehicles with equal accuracy."44
This seems to be a matter requiring the utmost care on the part of the officer
operating the device, particularly when the unit is being operated in an area of
dense traffic.
Another feature of the device is that it will record the highest speed within the
zone of influence at one time. Thus, if two moving objects are within the zone, the

38. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1200, 1202 (1952), which states:
Whether the dearth of American authority on the point is any indication that
the American courts are committed to a negative view as to the presumption
of accuracy, it is impossible to say. It should be observed, however, that
in many of the American cases there has been a failure to object to the
introduction of such evidence on the ground that the measuring instrument
has not been tested for accuracy. In other cases, proof of accuracy has been
accepted, and so no presumption was needed.
39. Nicholas v. Penny, [1950] 2 K.B. 466.
40. Peterson v. State, 163 Neb. 669, 80 N.W.2d 688 (1957).
41. 2 N.Y.2d 390, 141 N.E.2d 553, 161 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1957).
42. Id. at 393, 141 N.E.2d at 555, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
43. See also People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335
(1958). It is rumored that some police agencies use their radar equipment to test
the speedometers in their patrol cars. If this is so, it is possible to conceive a situation where each is used to test the other.
44. Kopper, Symposium: Radar Speedmeters-The Scientific Reliability of Radar
Speedmeters, 33 N.C.L. REv. 343, 352 (1955).
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fastest moving of the two will be recorded. This again raises special problems where
heavy traffic is involved in the matter of identification of the proper party to receive
the summons. This will be discussed below at greater length. However, it is seen
that a swinging sign, flying bird, wind blown paper or even a leaf could cause the
dial of the unit to reflect a greater speed than that of the vehicle under observation.
Dr. Kopper points out however, that these events will usually reflect only for a "short
duration and can be properly interpreted" 45 by a competent operator.
Also it is pointed out that certain other types of electronic devices, such as
diathermy machines used by hospitals, may cause the radar to reflect an inaccurate
reading. But this again can be interpreted by a competent operator as it will result in
"jumps" of the dial. 46 However, it would seem that an opportunity for error would
be present, in the remote situation where the diathermy machine or other device is
turned on while the target vehicle is in the zone of influence.
Changing weather conditions, temperature changes, and the like, could also affect
the accuracy of the unit, but if the unit is not used for an extended period of time
this would seem to be minimal. It would seem desirable that the officer operating
the unit note on the graph sheet the time and weather conditions at the beginning
and ending of the period of operation in the event a condition change should be used
as a defense to the accuracy of the unit.
Aging parts and general wear, along with the battery of the radar car going
down, as well as distance from the roadway at which the unit is placed, all resolve
themselves in the motorist's favor. This is due to the fact that less "beats" would be
transmitted and reflected back, thus resulting in something less than the true reading
47
of the speed of the target vehicle.
In People v. Sachs the court first states that judicial notice win be taken of the
accuracy of the class of instruments in future cases, then states:
It is from that point of acceptance that the court should require operative and
mechanical proof to the effect that1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The radar car was properly set up in its detecting location.
The radar instruments used were working.
The apprehending car was set in its own location.
That both cars were visible to each other at a reasonable distance.
That a motorcycle or other vehicle equipped with a calibrated speedometer had been used at the begining and the end of the tour to test the
accuracy of the radar set; the manner in which tests were made.
6. The graph sheet shows the results of these tests.
7. That the speedometer on the motorcycle or other vehicle had been tested
in the manner hereinbefore described [with a master speedometer] and
found to be accurate.
8. The radar car officer observed the speeding vehicle as well as any other
vehicle, and his description of the speeding vehicle.

45. Id. at 352.
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id. at 352.
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9. The defendant was apprehended, and what the apprehending officer did to
insure that the proper defendant was served with the summons.
It would seem that the defendant under this method of proof is fully
48
protected in his rights.
Thus it is seen that many considerations present themselves in determining the
accuracy of the particular unit at the time of summoning a particular defendant.
Although these safeguards may be perplexing to some agencies using this device, it
would appear reasonable to require compliances with standards at least as stringent
as above discussed, as many defendants will have their only contact with the criminal
law as a result of a summons for speeding, detected by radar.
IDENIFICATION

The area of identification of the violator seems to present two problems. First,
can the radar operator sufficiently identify the violator, when two vehicles are in
the zone of influence at the same time? This goes to the knowledge of the radar
operator himself. Second, once the radar operator does know the violator, has he
sufficiently identified his vehicle so that the pick up officer knows which motorist to
serve with the summons? This goes to the knowledge of the pick up officer.
In dealing with the first problem, it is convenient to quote from Dr. Kopper's
article again for clarity:
An important feature of the speedmeter is that it will read the higher of the
speeds of two cars running simultaneously through the zone at different
speeds. If two cars are running abreast of each other at the same speed
through the zone the speedmeter cannot tell which car is being observed,
but its reading will be the speed of either of them. It is then up to the
operator to ascertain that the cars are traveling abreast of each other. If one
49
is passing the other the speedmeter reads the higher of the two speeds.
In People v. Sachs the defendant contended that she was being passed by another
vehicle at the time her car passed through the zone of influence. The radar oprator
testified that he could sufficiently distinguish between the "blips" so as to determine
which car was speeding, even when several cars were in the zone of influence at
the same time. The court points out that this was submitted to the trier of facts and
resolved in favor of the officer and against the defendant, and that such a finding
would not be upset. The court recites with approval the metod of operation of the
radar team, which included the viewing of the violator by the radar officer all the
way to the point of apprehension by the pick up officer, and comunication by radio
at that time that the proper motorist was being served with the summons.
This raises the other point above, the problem of communicating to the pick up
officer information of such sufficiency as to insure his arresting the proper motorist.
Only one case seems to be directly in point. In People v. Sarver 5 O the radar officer

48. 1 Misc. 2d at 156-57, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
49. Kopper, supra note 44, at 352.
50. 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954).
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identified the violator only as "the green truck." The court held that this was
sufficient under the circumstances of the arrest.51
It therefore appears that as to the communication between the officers, identification Is a matter of fact to be established upon trial. Undoubtedly, the "dark sedan"
during night hours would not be sufficient, whereas the "green truck" during daylight
hours was sufficient. As a matter of comment, it would seem that great care should
be exercised in this area, for certainly punishing one man for another man's violation
is to be avoided at all costs. An error such as this would certainly breed great
hostility toward the parties and agencies involved as well as the criminal law in
general.
HEARSAY

In several of the reported cases some contention has been made of a hearsay
evidence objection.5 2 In only two of the cases has the objection been fertile.
In People v. Offermann a hearsay objection was made when the officer in the
pick up and test car testified that his speedometer read the same as the radar speedmeter when he drove through, and vice-versa. The conviction was reversed for this
and other reasons. This defect was cured in the next reported case, People v.
Torpey, by merely having the test car officer and the radar car officer testify as to
the readings on the Instruments in their respective vehicles at the time of the test.
The second case in which the hearsay contention was successful is People v.
Sarver wherein the court holds that the complaint which was filed by the arresting
officer rather than the radar officer was based on hearsay information as to the
defendant's speed. In this case, however, the conviction was not reversed as sufficient
evidence of violation was presented by the testimony of the officers that in their
opinion the defendant was travelling in excess of the speed limit, independent of~the
radar information.
He testified that the defendant's car approached him at a speed of approximately thirty-five miles per hour, so that he could be said to have personal
knowledge of the violation. If the city's evidence of speed was solely confined to the speed meter graph, it would seem that officer Rabbitt, who was
operating the speed meter, would be the logical person to swear to the
information.5 1
This language raises certain problems and questions of tort liability in the area
of false arrest and false imprisonment which will be briefly discussed later. 54

51. Apparently, no other green truck was in the area.
52. State v. Dantonio, 31 N.J. Super. 105, 105 A.2d 918 (1954); People v. Sarver,
205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Torpey, 204 Misc.
1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County Ct. 1953); People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125
N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Hardaway v. Tennessee, 302 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1957);
State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293 P.2d 399 (1956).
53. 205 Misc. at 527, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
54. See Annot,, 49 A.L.R.2d 469, 476 (1956), which states:
Although no case upon the subject has been discovered, it has been suggested
that arrests made in-the normal operation of a radar device may be illegal
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In the Dantonio case a hearsay objection was made in regard to testing the
equipment, much as in the Offermann. case. The court had little trouble disposing of
this contention on the same theory as the Torpey case; that each officer merely
testified to the reading of his own instrument. It is seen that it is necessary for both
officers to appear and that this line of objections easily avoided by establishing the
reading of the instruments within their respective view at the time of the check.
A rather weak attempt at a hearsay objection is found in Hardaway v. Tennessee.
The defendant contended that the evidence was not "within the presence" of the
officer, but the court holds that this instrument is the same as the speedometer in
this regard, and that the officer who saw the instrument made the arrest. This is the
case wherein the same officer and car were used for both the timing and the arrest.
In the Washington case 55 it would seem that the most valid hearsay contention of
all was raised. Here, the defendant contended that it was improper for the officer
in the pick up car to testify to the speed of the defendant's vehicle. The defendant
also alleged a false arrest based on hearsay information. However, the court in
affirming the conviction held that since the case was tried to the court, and the court
sustained the objection to the evidence on the trial, it would be presumed that the
court as trier of fact would disregard the testimony. Apparently Washington follows
the common law on matters of arrest.
It would seem that the objection made in the Washington case would be valid in
Missouri, as Missouri follows the common law rules of arrest except where changed
by statute.56 As is stated in State ex rel. Patterson v. Collins:7
Except for situations where the right is specially given by statute, a peace
officer has no authority, without a warrant, to arrest a person charged with
the commission of a misdemeanor unless the offense was committed in the
officer's presence. 58
It is therefore seen that a great question exists as to whether the arrest or
summoning of the speed violator by the officer in the pick up car, based solely upon
information transmitted to him over police radio, is "in his presence" as above stated.
As the dial is viewed only by the radar officer, and the results transmitted to the
pick up officer over police radio, it is seen that the pick up officer does not have
personal knowledge of the violation and must rely upon the communication from the
radar officer. Should it be held that this information is not "in the presence" of the
arresting officer, then it would seem that his action is both tortious and criminal.5 1
in jurisdictions where an officer is forbidden to make an arrest without a
warrant except where the offense is committed in his presence, since the
officer in the advance car, who apprehends the driver, relies only upon
information radioed ahead by the officer in the radar car.
55. State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293 P.2d 399 (1956).
56. See §§ 84.090, .440, RSMo 1949, authorizing arrest on suspicion of misdemeanor in St. Louis and Kansas City.
57. 172 S.W.2d 284 (St. L. Ct. App. 1943).
58. Id. at 291.
59. § 558.190, RSMo 1949, provides:
If any sheriff or other officer, or any person pretending to be any officer,
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If this is in fact an illegal arrest, then it is obvious that a civil action would lie
against the arresting officer for false imprisonment. In the event the officer should
jail the defendant rather than merely summon him, the damages would be something greater than nominal, to say the least.60
The possibility of a defense to the criminal action on the theory that an illegal
arrest is involved is a more difficult question. It is held in Missouri, and most
common law states, that a police officer has no authority to arrest on mere suspicion
that a misdemeanor has been committed, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, and the misdemeanor must be committed in the presence of the arresting
officer to constitute a legal arrest. 61
Since the Sarver case indicates that it was improper for the pick up officer to file
the complaint, it would seem that the court is holding that the violation was not
committed in the presence of the pick up officer. Would it follow that the arrest by
the pick up officer is illegal? Would it follow that this is the explanation of that
holding? Perhaps so. The question remains whether this arrest, if illegal, would
provide a defense to the criminal action if the complaint is filed by the radar officer
on information gained by the pick up officer as a result of the illegal arrest.
In Missouri, it is held that an arrest has been made when an officer commands
the motorist to stop, and the defendant does stop in obedience thereto. 0 2 Therefore, it
would seem that if the officer has no authority to arrest for a misdmeanor unless
committed in his presence and the speed violation is not committed within the presence of the pick up officer, and if stopping upon command constitutes an arrest, the
detention of the motorist in this case would constitute an arrest, and for the above
reasons, an illegal arrest. In this case, however, the officer merely issues a "summons"
to the violator (in all the reported cases) and does not take him to the county jail.
Does this change the situation? Research has disclosed no authority in Missouri for

under color or pretense of any process or other legal authority, arrest any
person, or detain him against his will, or seize or levy upon any property,
or dispossess anyone of any lands or tenements, without due and legal
process, or other lawful authority therefor, he shall, upon conviction, be
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
60. PROSSEM, LAW OF Toars § 12 (2d ed. 1955), states:
False imprisonment is the confinement of the plaintiff within boundaries
fixed by the defendant, without legal justification, by an act or breach of
a duty intended to result in such confinement.
61. State v. McBride, 327 Mo. 184, 37 S.W.2d 423 (1931); State v. Gartland, 304
Mo. 87, 263 S.W. 165 (1924); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924) (en
banc); State v. Dunivan, 217 Mo. App. 548, 269 S.W. 415 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925). 1
AIXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST § 77, at 447 (1949) states:
There is no inherent right, power or authority of any person, officer or
nonofficer, to arrest for any misdemeanor not committed in his presence;
and where there is any it must be expressly conferred by statute. It is
questionable whether a mere local ordinance or traffic rule could confer
it; as the matter of arrest is important enough for constitutions or general
laws only! And, it is repeated here, that it is of the utmost importance for
officers, as well as nonofficers, to know what are misdemeanors.
62. State v. Dunivan, supra note 61.
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the "summons." It appears that the "summons" or "citation" is given to the motorist
as a matter of courtesy, and informs him that if he fails to appear at the appointed
time and place a warrant for his arrest will issue and he will then be forceably
brought before the appointed person. What then is the "summons"? It is issued in connection with a technical arrest as the mere stopping of the defendant against his will
6 3
is held to constitute an arrest. Perhaps the "summons" can be considered as a lesser
included power to arrest, with the net effect that the violator is released upon his own
recognizance at that time, a breach of which will cause a warrant to issue. If the
arrest is complete when the defendant is stopped against his will it is difficult to
see how the arrest is any more legal or could be considered legal merely because
the officer issues a "summons" instead of carting the defendant off to the county jail.
It is entirely possible that if the defendant attempted to leave the location of the
arrest prior to the issuance of the "summons," he would be detained by the pick up
64
officer by the use of all necessary force to effect the detention.

Assuming and not concluding that the arrest is in fact illegal, the question of a
defense to the criminal action for the misdemeanor because of the illegal arrest still
remains. Even if the arrest is illegal, will this be a defense to the prosecution of the
speeding violation? This will be determined by the ruling on a timely motion to
suppress the evidence gained by the pick up officer as the product of his illegal act.
What is the evidence gained by virtue of the illegal arrest? Nothing is taken from
the defendant. The only evidence the pick up officer obtains is the identification of
the violator. As a practical matter, the radar officer in the two-men operation cannot
know the absolute identity of the driver of an automobile passing through the zone
of influence. He may be able to identify the vehicle well enough that he can describe
it sufficiently to the pick up officer, but he cannot know the identity of the driver
sufficiently of his own knowledge to swear in court that "this man" was the driver
of the violating vehicle. He cannot know the identity of the driver well enough and
certain enough to cause a complaint to be filed against him. Practically speaking, the
best he can hope to do is to obtain a description of the vehicle and perhaps a few
numerals of the license plate, in his fleeting glimpse of the violator. The pick up
officer is the person who really "ties down" the identity of the violator, for when he
"arrests" him, he has opportunity to examine the operators license and other papers
on the person of the driver of the vehicle.
The argument against suppressing the evidence obtained by the pick up officer in
this situation is something like this: The general rule is that an illegal arrest is no
defense to a criminal action. This concededly, is true, and is as it should be. How-

63. Ibid.
64. Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 VA. L. Rv. 809, 810 n.1 (1954). In
commenting on the Virginia statute quoted in note 25 supra, Woodbridge says:
Section (b) is obviously desirable since in the absence of statute an officer
has no right to arrest for a misdemeanor not comnmitted in his presence
unless he has a warrant. In the case of two-man teams the misdemeanor is
committed in the presence of the one who takes the reading and not in the
presence of the one who effects the arrest.
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ever, the fact situations to which the general rule is applied involve a different
situation than here involved. The state has evidence, obtained by lawful means, upon
which to prosecute the accused; a police officer effects an illegal arrest, either extraterritorily, by trick, or upon some false ground. In this case, all information gained
by the officer performing the illegal arrest can be suppressed, but of course all good
and lawful evidence obtained by other means cannot be suppressed. Therefore,
once the defendant is in custody, the state can proceed against him with the lawful
evidence. The mere fact that the defendant is in custody by virtue of an illegal
arrest is no defense to the criminal prosecution, provided the state has evidence
other than that obtained during the illegal arrest. It is obvious that if the state
gains the.evidence necessary to the prosecution by virtue of the illegal arrest, it
can be suppressed and the prosecution will fail. Therefore, the general rule applies
only to taking custody of the body of the defendant, reducing him to possession so
to speak, and does not have the broad effect that the mere statement of the rule
might convey to the novice.
Can the general rule apply to the case in question? Here, the information
necessary to the state's case is obtained by and through the arrest. If the cases
allowing evidence to be suppressed if obtained by illegal arrest are applied to this
type of evidence, that is, the identification of the defendant, it would appear that
the general rule would not apply, and therefore the illegal arrest would be a valid
and good defense to the criminal action.
In the liquor cases, arising during prohibition, the area of authority of police
officers to arrest without warrant for misdemeanors is clearly set out. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the law was laid out in cases involving the antiquated crime of
possession of liquor, for the cases tend to be categorized as liquor cases and
discounted on that ground. This is unfortunate, for the severity of the penalty in
those cases explain their appeal, and few other misdemeanor cases are reported as
the penalty imposed seldom warrants appeal. In many of the liquor cases statements
against fruitful prosecution are made. This should indicate their value, for they are
discounted in importance by the feeling that the rules laid down in them extend
the lawful powers of arrest wherever possible in order to obtain convictions. This
may have been the case in some jurisdictions, but not so in Missouri. The Missouri
court "kept its head" during this era, and applied the law as it existed to those
cases and did not become overzealous in favor of prosecution to the extent of
"bending" the law.
This is to say that the cases should not be discounted merely because they
involve liquor during prohibition, but should be carefully considered for the rules
of arrest in misdemeanor cases as expressed in them.
Among the leading cases of that era is State v. Owens.6 5 In this case, the sheriff
of Stone County, Missouri had been informed by his deputy that someone was in
possession of liquor. The sheriff, eager to do his job well, detained the defendant

65.

302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
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in front of a restaurant, "seized him, and took a pint bottle of whisky out of
Owens' hip pocket. The sheriff, according to his own account of the matter,
tempered this violence with a gentle touch, for Owens 'never hollered nor made
66
The Supreme Court
no big noise' in protest of the unconventional proceeding."
of Missouri, White, J. writing for the court, delivered an opinion of particular
clarity of expression, and points out that misdemeanor cases are such that a police
officer has no authority to arrest on suspicion. Further, that these cases are to be
distinguished from those involving suspicion of felony, and those wherein the officer
sees the misdemeanor committed. The reasons for this rule of law are explained
ably, and many cases from other jurisdictions are reviewed.
The basis of the appeal in the Owens case is that the defendant filed a timely
motion to suppress the evidence obtained by virtue of the illegal arrest. It is pointed
out that since the arrest is illegal, the search is also illegal, and therefore "unreasonable" within the prohibition of the Missouri constitution.67 Since the arrest was
based solely upon the sheriff's suspicion that the defendant was in the possession of
liquor, and he did not have personal knowledge of it, the arrest fell clearly within
the doctrine that no authority exists for the arrest of misdemeanants on suspicion.
The court discusses the constitutional prohibition to great extent, and concludes
that the desirability of enforcing the misdemeanor statute does not outweight the
rights to the defendant secured to him by the constitution so as to be "reasonable"
in that sense of the word. Since the motion to suppress had been erronously
overruled, the conviction was reversed.
The analogy to be drawn from this and other cases to the present case is not
perfect. The cases in which the motion to suppress was ruled to be proper all
involve the suppression of actual physical evidence, and extend to preclude the
officer from testifying about the seizure and his observations at the time of and
during the illegal arrest. In the radar case, no physical evidence is obtained by
virtue of the arrest. There is nothing taken from the defendant. The only thing
in the way of evidence gained by the illegal arrest is the identity of the defendant.
This poses the question of whether this information can be suppressed in Missouri.
It appears that the question has heretofore been only of academic value as this
type of arrest has not presented itself in the reported cases. This type of arrest
must be distinguished from the two-man arrest wherein the pursuing officer requires
aid and assistance from a second officer when the violator is escaping the pursuing
officer. In that situation, the second officer may effect a detention of the defendant
until the pursuing officer arrives at the scene of the detention. The arrest by the
second officer may be illegal and tortious, but the damage to the defendant would
be nominal if the action of false imprisonment were brought. The pursuing officer
will generally go to the location of the detention, identify the defendant, and take
charge of him. If a "summons" is issued, it will be issued by the pursuing officer,
and not the assisting officer. In the event a motion to suppress were sustained

66. Id. at 355, 259 S.W. at 101.
Mo. CONST. art. II § 11 (1875), as amended, Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 15 (1945).

67.
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against the second officer, the prosecution could continue on the complaint and
testimony of the pursuing officer. In this case nothing in evidence necessary to the
case is gained by the arrest by the second officer.
Is the identification of the defendant evidence in the sense that it would be
protected by the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Must the evidence to be suppressable be something that has physical properties?
Is it the physical properties of the bottle of liquor, of the concealed weapon, of the
stolen merchandise of the petit larcenist that which makes it inadmissible when
timely motion to suppress is made? Or is it that the spirit of the rule is that the
state cannot gain and use in the prosecution of a misdemeant information gained
by unlawful arrest? The latter would seem to be the basis of the rule. The seizure
of the liquor is the thing that makes the state's case complete. Without it, the
state has no case. When the evidence which has been illegally obtained in that
case is suppressed, the conviction is also suppressed, in that it fails. Can it be that
the spirit of this rule, whether constitutional or not, would also preclude the thing
in the radar case that makes the case for the prosecution complete if it too is
obtained by virtue of an illegal arrest? If so, that the evidence obtained does not
have physical properties should make no difference. If the identification of the
defendant, the completing element to the state's case, is obtained by illegal means,
by virtue of an illegal arrest, perhaps the state should be denied the use of such
evidence on a timely motion to suppress. As is said in the Owens case:
The trend of the argument in favor of admitting such evidence is that
it is necessary and the only way to enforce the prohibition law. That brings
us squarely to the paradoxical pronouncement: It is necessary to violate the
law in order to enforce the law!
The Mayen Case makes the further point that this unlawful seizure is
complete and finished: The offense is ancient history at the time of the trial,
and the exclusion of the evidence would not redress the wrong which the
defendant has suffered.
Since the wrong was already inflicted, we should forget it and allow
the wrongdoer to enjoy the fruits of it in the approval of the court and the
conscious virtue of carrying through his enterprise to a successful finish.
The question is not whether the defendant can be redressed in his case upon
trial, but whether the reckless officer may be encouraged by the approval
of the court to repeat the trespass. 68
Again, it must be remembered that this is a misdemeanor case, and the social
value of a prosecution has been held throughout our law not to outweigh the value
of respect for the rules of evidence and the rights of the individual citizen to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure of his person and possessions.
In State v. McBrideG9 it is held that a search and seizure connected with an
illegal arrest is "unreasonable" within the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures:

68. 302 Mo. at 377, 259 S.W. at 109.
69. 327 Mo. 184, 37 S.W.2d 423 (1931).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

21

1959]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 4
COMMENTS

It follows that whether defendant was arrested before being searched or
not, the search of his person was umlawful and was therefore unreasonable
within the meaning of our constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures ....
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence so
obtained should have been sustained and at the trial the evidence should
70
not have been admitted, as it was, over his objections.
Statutes authorizing arrest for misdemeanors on mere suspicion in Kansas City
and St. Louis have been held constitutional. 7 1 It would thus appear that freedom
from arrest on suspicion of misdemeanor is not a constitutional right, but that the
legislature in its wisdom of the social circumstances in those areas has the power
to authorize the arrest. As a necessary corollary of this, it would seem that in those
areas, under statute, police officers could effect a valid search based upon an arrest
for suspicion of misdemeanor, as it is the illegality of the arrest that renders the
search constitutionally objectionable, and not the fact that it is made in connection
with arrest for misdemeanor on suspicion. Although the legislature cannot define
what will constitute an "unreasonable" search and seizure as this is a judicial
question,72 the court will determine that a search and seizure connected immediately with a lawful arrest may be reasonable and not prohibited by the constitution,
whereas a search connected with an illegal arrest cannot be reasonable and is
prohibited by the constitution.
At first blush, this may appear inconsistent, as it looks as though the legislature
can determine what will constitute a reasonable search and seizure by either
authorizing or prohibiting a certain type of arrest. This is not the case. The court
is merely holding that that which is illegal cannot be reasonable. Not all searches
and seizures connected with a lawful arrest are reasonable, but certainly those
connected with an illegal arrest cannot be reasonable.
This again brings us to the question of whether or not the operation in the
radar case involves the principles which the cases above are based upon. Certainly
the analogy is not perfect. Again, those cases involve suppression of physical bits
of evidence, and the testimony of the officer relating thereto. Is there a valid
distinction? To pose a ridiculous example, suppose it were made a misdemeanor
to eat onions on Sunday. Could evidence of the breath of the defendant be suppressed if gained by illegally smelling the defendant? Would this be a "search
and seizure" within the meaning of the constitution? How does this differ from the
bottle of liquor?
If the spirit of the constitutional provision is that "unreasonable" goes to the
method of obtaining evidence, rather than to the form of the evidence seized, it
would appear immaterial whether the evidence which makes the state's case
complete was in physical form, or merely the identity of the defendant. If the
Supreme Court of Missouri still adheres to the doctrine laid down in the Owens

70. Id. at 189, 37 S.W.2d at 425.
71. State v. Gartland, 304 Mo. 87, 263 S.W. 165 (1925).
72. State v Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 358, 259 S.W. 100, 101 (1924).
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and McBride cases, that evidence obtained by virtue of an illegal arrest is within
the constitutional provision and can be suppressed by timely motion, then it would
appear that in the radar case, a timely motion to suppress the identification of the
violator on the grounds that it was obtained by an illegal arrest should receive the
same welcome by being sustained. Perhaps there is a distinction to be drawn, but
the distinction would appear to go to the form of the evidence and not to the concept
of "reasonableness" which is held to be the guiding light of this constitutional
guaranty.
It must be pointed out that the two-man team method of operating the radar
device is not the only method of operating it. There are at least two other ways
of operating the device which would not involve the principles of arrest herein
discussed. The first method is to set the radar up at one location, then take the
meters to a point some distance from the device by means of long cables, and use
only one officer. The arresting officer is then the viewing officer, and there can
be no contention that the violation is not in his presence. The second method is to
permit the radar car to pursue the violator and serve him with the summons. This
seems to be the method used in the Tennessee case. 73 Therefore, any argument of
necessity on behalf of the two-man method is without merit. If the two-man
method is desirable, then the legislature can by statute authorize arrest on suspicion
of misdemeanor in this particular instance, as have the legislatures of other states. 74
Such legislation would preclude the defense herein discussed, as well as the
possibility of a tort action against our law enforcers.
E. MTCHELL HOUGH

DOMICILE REQUIREMENTS FOR DIVORCE IN MISSOURI
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that for a state to grant a
divorce entitled to full faith and credit under article IV, section I, of the United
States Constitution it must be the domicile of one or both of the parties. 1 This has

73. Hardaway v. Tennessee, 302 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1957).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-215.2 (Supp. 1958); 1iM. Amr. CODE art. 35, § 91 (1957).
- 1. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175
(1901); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1399 (1945).
Domicile consists of physical presence in a given jurisdiction with intent to
reside therein permanently or indefinitely. Haymes v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 16
F.R.D. 118, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
To constitute domicile there must be both the fact of a fixed habitation or
abode in a particular place and an intention to remain there permanently and indefinitely. To constitute change of domicile three things are essential: "(1) residence
in another place; (2) an intention to abandon the old domicile; and (3) an intention
of acquiring a new one." Elliott v. Boyd, 182 Ore. 1, 14, 15, 185 P.2d 555, 561 (1947).
Domicile is the place with which a person has a settled connection for certain
legal purposes, either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned
to him by the law. REsTATEENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 9 (1934). This Restatement
also provides:
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been interpreted to require domicile as a constitutional basis for
Most state courts take the position that domicile is required for
On its face, section 452.0504 would seem to raise a question
required in Missouri. The principal parts of this statute have

divorce jurisdiction.

2

divorce jurisdiction. "3
whether domicile is
been in effect since

1825. 5 They read as follows:
No person shall be entitled to a divorce from the bonds of matrimony
who has not resided within the state one whole year next before filing of the
petition, unless the offense or injury complained of was committed within
this state, or while one or both of the parties resided within this state ....
It can be seen that this statute uses "resided" and not "domiciled." Nowhere in the
statute is "resided" defined.
However, in Phelps v. PhelpsO and State ex tel. Stoffey v. LaDriere7 the courts
found that "resided" as used in the statute means or is the same as "domiciled." This
is the view taken by many other states where a statute for divorce jurisdiction
requires residence. 8 In the Phelps case the Kansas City Court of Appeals said:
The word 'residence' is often but not always used in the sense of 'domicil'
and its meaning in a legal phrase must be determined in each case. The
courts of the state have held that the 'residence' required by our divorce
statutes is equivalent to 'domicil'. 9
Both the supreme court and the courts of appeals of Missouri have said that
residence is acquired by an intention to live at a place permanently or for an indefinite time .coupled with actual bodily presence, though this presence need not be
continuous.'

0

This would be in accord with definitions usually given domicile.

1

§ 15 Domicile of choice
(1) ...
(2)

To acquire a domicile of choice, a person must establish a dwellingplace with the intention of making it his home.
(3) The fact of physical presence at a dwelling-place and the intention to
make it a home must concur; if they do so, even for a moment, the
change of domicile takes place.
2. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610
(1954).
3. Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948); Crouch v. Crouch,
28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P.2d 897 (1946); Coe v. Coe, 316 Mass. 423, 55 N.E.2d 702 (1944);
Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942) (en bane); Phelps v. Phelps, 241

Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952);
§ 111 (1934).

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws

4. All statutory references are to RSMo 1949 unless otherwise indicated.
5. Hays v. Hays, 324 Mo. 810, 24 S.W.2d 997 (1930).
6. 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952).
7. 273 S.W.2d 776 (St. L. Ct. App. 1954).
8. McCary v. McCary, 253 Ala. 468, 45 So. 2d 292 (1950); Walsh v. Walsh, 215
La. 1099, 42 So. 2d 860 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950); Wray v. Wray, 149
Neb. 376, 31 N.W.2d 228 (1948).
9. 241 Mo. App. at 1209, 246 S.W.2d at 844.
10. Nolker v. Nolker, 257 S.W. 798 (Mo. 1924) (en banc); Madsen v. Madsen, 193
S.W.2d 507 (Spr. Ct. App. 1946); Lewis v. Lewis, 238 Mo. App. 173, 176 S.W.2d 556
(K.C. Ct. App. 1943); Bradshaw v. Bradshaw 166 S.W.2d 805 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942);
Smoot v. Smoot, 227 Mo. App. 1246, 61 S.W.2d 373 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933); Trigg v.
Trigg, 226 Mo. App. 284, 41 S.W.2d 583 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931); Finley v. Finley, 6
S.W.2d 1006 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
11. See note 1 supra.
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Often in referring to the requirements of this statute, Missouri courts have used

the phrase "residence or domicile"'12 which shows they consider them as one. These
decisions make it clear that "resided" in section 452.050 means or is interpreted
as "domiciled."
Reading only section 452.050 it may appear that no residence requirement is
necessary if the offense or injury complained of was committed within the state,
or while one or both parties resided within Missouri. However section 452.040
requires that "the proceedings shall be had in the county where the plaintiff resides."
Again there would be a question of tfhe domicile requirement as laid down in
Williams v. North Carolina 11.13 The Missouri cases seem to have removed this
question. In Kruse v. Kruse14 decided in 1857, the only Missouri supreme court case
found which seems squarely in point in interpreting these statutes, the wife sued
for divorce from a husband she had married in St. Louis and with whom she had
lived there for a few months. He -then left her and went to California. She then
lived with her father, apparently in Missouri, some fifteen or sixteen months before
going to Kentucky. She resided there when the action was brought. She contended
that as the offense occurred in Missouri and while they both resided in Missouri
that she did not now need to be a resident. In a very short opinion the court rejected
this argument saying "the second section [now appearing as section 452.040] . . .
clearly shows that the plaintiff must be a resident of this state."' 5 This case thus
holds that section 452.050 must be considered with section 452.040 and only if the
plaintiff is a resident may he obtain a divorce in Missouri.
In Pate v. Pate 16 the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's pleading on the
ground that the petition did not contain allegations essential to confer jurisdiction
on the court, in that it was not alleged that the plaintiff was a resident of St. Louis
County when the petition was filed. The plaintiff contended that the statute required
no residence when the offense was committed within the state. The trial court
sustained the defendant's contention. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed.
They said Kruse v. Kruse had given the correct interpretation of the statutes (now
sections 452.040 and 450.250) and the plaintiff must be a resident of Missouri.
In McConnell v. McConnel117 plaintiff husband filed for divorce against his wife
whom he alleged committed adultery in St. Louis, Missouri. The plaintiff lived in
New York and had never resided or lived in St. Louis or any part of Missouri.
The trial court denied the divorce. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed and in
doing so approved a statement by the trial court which said:

12. Nolker v. Nolker, supra note 10; State ex rel. Taubman v. Davis, 199 Mo.
App. 439, 203 S.W. 654 (K.C. Ct. App. 1918).
13. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). At least two other states have statutes somewhat similar
to Missouri which could raise the same questions of interpretation. CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 46-1-1 (1953); MMiN. STAT. Axw. §§ 518.07, .09 (1945).
14.
15.
16.

25 Mo. 68 (1857).
Id. at 70.
6 Mo. App. 49 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).

17. 167 Mo. App. 680, 151 S.W. 175 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
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If the offense or injury complained of was committed within this State,
then the plaintiff in the divorce suit need not have resided within the State
one whole year next before the filing of the petition; the plaintiff in such
case may have resided here less than a year. But the statute nowhere
authorizes one who is not a resident of the State to institute suit for divorce
in this state under any circumstances ....18
In Hays v. Hays 9 the Supreme Court of Missouri touched on the divorce
problem. The Jackson County circuit court had held that it had no jurisdiction
because all acts charged occurred in Kansas before plaintiff acquired a residence
in Missouri. The supreme court reversed and said this in discussing Missouri divorce
law:
Section 1804, Revised Statutes 1919, [now section 452.050] must be construed as if it provided in so many words that a divorce shall be authorized
for any of the grounds appearing in section 1801, [now section 452.010] no
matter where the acts constituting such grounds were committed, if the
injured party has resided in Missouri 'one whole year next before filing of
the petition'; but that, where the acts constituting the grounds of divorce
were committed 'within this state, or whilst one or both of the parties resided
within this state,' it is only necessary for the complaining party to be a
20
resident of this state at the time of filing the petition.
Kokinakis v. Kokinalis21 involved a Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, soldier who
had not resided in Missouri prior to entering the army. He testified that he then
claimed residence at Fort Leonard Wood, Pulaski County. He and defendant were
married in Missouri, she being a Missouri resident. The trial court denied a divorce
because the plaintiff was not a Missouri resident. The Springfield Court of Appeals
reversed, saying:
He was undoubtedly a resident of Missouri.... But we do not need to
put plaintiff's right to a divorce upon his residence . . . the indignities,
occurring in Missouri, ...were ample to constitute the plaintiff the injured
22
party and to entitle him to a divorce.
No cases are cited in the opinion nor is there any mention of section 452.040. The
court appeared to take section 452.050 as it stands or reads alone. This does not
23
square with the interpretation made in the earlier decisions.
A case reaching a result similiar to the Kokinakis case is Montgomery v. Montgomery.2 4 This case also involved a Fort Leonard Wood soldier who was apparently
a non-resident of Missouri at the time of his being sent to Fort Leonard Wood.
He had married his wife in California prior to coming to Missouri. The trial court

18. Id. at 682, 151 S.W. at 176.
19. 324 Mo. 810, 24 S.W.2d 997 (1930).
20. Id. at 816-17, 24 S.W.2d at 999-1000.
21. 180 S.W.2d 243 (Spr. Ct. App. 1944).
22. Id. at 244.
23. Hays v. Hays, 324 Mo. 810, 24 S.W.2d 997 (1930); Kruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68
(1857); McConnell v. McConnell, 167 Mo. App. 680, 151 S.W. 175 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912);
Pate v. Pate, 6 Mo. App. 49 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
24. 185 S.W.2d 870 (Spr. Ct. App. 1945).
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denied the divorce because it did not believe him a resident of Missouri. The Springfield Court of Appeals reversed, but did not try to decide whether the plaintiff was
a resident. That court said:
According to the decisions of this and other courts, defendant submitted
herself to the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Missouri, by her answer and
motion for temporary alimony, and the Circuit Court ... thereafter had full
venue in the case and had the right and power thereafter to pass on the
marital relationship between plaintiff and defendant, regardless of ordinary
jurisdiction, and we need not consider the question of jurisdiction at all. 20
The court quoted at length from King v. King,2 6 including the following statement:
[I]t is now well settled that the provision of the statute requiring that,
'the proceedings shall be held in the county where the plaintiff resides . . .'
merely prescribes the venue of such cases, is not jurisdictional in character,
27
and may be waived.
However in the King case and six of the seven cases relied on in the Montgomery
case 28 it clearly appears that the plaintiff was a Missouri resident, the only question
being whether he was a resident of the county where the divorce was asked for or
had been granted. In Werz v. Werz, 2o the other case cited in the Montgomery case,
there was nothing to show that his wife who had sought the divorce was not a Missouri resident.
The Montgomery case thus held that the portion of section 452.040 requiring that
the action be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides is only jurisdictional to the person, that this requirement is not jurisdictional to the subject matter
of the action, and that it can be waived by appearance of the defendant, even where
the parties are non-residents. The court based its decision on cases involving
residents. 30 Those cases held that even if the action were brought in a county other
than that where the plaintiff resided, the defendant by appearing would waive the
jurisdiction required by section 452.040. Later that same year it was stated in
discussing the same statute:
Want of residence in the state goes to the jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Want of residence in the county goes to the jurisdiction of the person
which may be waived by appearance to the merits. 3 1
In neither the Montgomery case nor Kokinakis v. Kokinakis does it appear that

25. Id. at 871.
26. 237 Mo. App. 764, 170 S.W.2d 982 (Spr. Ct. App. 1943).
27. 185 S.W.2d at 871.
28. Osmak v. American Car & Foundry Co., 328 Mo. 159, 40 S.W.2d 714 (1931);
Nolker v. Nolker, 257 S.W. 798 (Mo. 1924) (en banc); Johnson v. Johnson, 141 S.W.2d
229 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940); Tate v. Tate, 227 Mo. App. 1141, 59 S.W.2d 790 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1933); Walton v. Walton, 6 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928); Lagerholm v.
Lagerholm, 133 Mo. App. 306, 112 S.W. 720 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908) (dissenting opinion).
29. 11 Mo. App. 26 (St. L. Ct. App. 1881)
30. See cases cited note 28 supra.
31. Barth v. Barth, 189 S.W.2d 451 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945). The same view is taken
in Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952).
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there was any question raised as to the power of a state to grant a divorce where
neither party was domiciled there.
In Madsen v. Madsen, 32 involving another Fort Leonard Wood soldier who sued
for divorce claiming to be a Missouri resident, the Springfield Court of Appeals
seemed to throw new light on its Kokimtkis holding. After saying that the evidence
showed that the plaintiff was a resident of Missouri one year before filing his petition
the court made the following statement citing among others the Kokidnkis case:
[W]here the injuries or offenses complained of in an action for divorce
were committed within this state, the full one year's residence is not a
33
jurisdictional requisite.
This statement would always seem to require some residence.
In Phelps v. Phelps the plaintiff wife prior to her marriage was a resident of
Texas. She married the defendant, a Missouri resident, on March 4, 1947 and lived
with him until about March 5, 1949 when plaintiff returned to Texas. The offense
if any must have occurred in Missouri or while the parties resided there. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff was not a resident and could
not maintain a divorce action. The court then said that although section 452.040 has
been interpreted as venue and not jurisdictional in respect to the subject matter
of the action where the plaintiff is a resident, Kruse v. Kruse held section 452.040
required the party applying for a divorce to be a resident of Missouri. This is so
even though the offense or injury complained of occurred in Missouri.
A case which perhaps strengthens the opinions interpreting the Missouri divorce
law as requiring residence or domicile is Wright v. Wright.3 4 There in discussing
the validity of a Nevada divorce the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
It is universally held that 'a state cannot exercise through its courts
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is domiciled within
35
the state.'
Missouri courts then would require some residence akin to domicile as a basis
for divorce, including those cases where the offense was committed within the state
or while one or both parties resided therein. Only the Kokinakis and Montgomery
cases appear to hold differently. It is questionable whether they carry much weight.
It may well be Missouri courts were of the opinion that even if section 452.050
had not been intended to require domicile, when the offense occurred in Missouri
or while one or both parties resided there, nevertheless they could not grant a valid
divorce to a non-domiciliary. 3 6 This feeling could have influenced the Missouri courts

32. 193 S.W.2d 507 (Spr. Ct. App. 1946).
33. Id. at 508.
34. 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942) (en banc).
35. Id. at 338, 165 S.W.2d at 875.
36. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). See also authorities cited note
3 supra.
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which decided that section 452.050 must be considered with section 452.040, and thus
required residence in Missouri.
Kruse v. Kruse was decided in 1857 and contains nothing to indicate the Supreme
Court of Missouri then felt domicile was necessary to divorce jurisdiction. However,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina II says that this conception
has been unquestioned since 1789 and even the framers of the United States Constitution were aware of it.37 Judge Hastie says it arose in America in the first half
of the 19th century. 38 So it is possible that the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1857
was aware of this idea.
Recently, however, at least two cases have taken issue with the domiciliary
requirement for divorce jurisdiction. In David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss39 the husband
challenged the wife's divorce action on the ground that the statute giving the court
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when the parties were married within the state
was unconstitutional. 40 The court held that marriage within the state was sufficient
to give that state power to dissolve the marriage saying:
Domicile is accepted as a basis of jurisdiction to divorce because a
State has a legitimate interest in the marital status of persons domiciled
within its borders; and it seems clear to me that the State in which a marriage
takes place has certainly as great and as legitimate an interest in the marital
status of the parties to that marriage, and that marriage in a State consequently is as good a basis of jurisdiction of divorce as is domicile of one
41
of the parties in the State.
In Wallace v. Wallace 42 a serviceman who had been stationed in New Mexico
for over a year was sued for a divorce. The trial court based its jurisdiction on
the New Mexico serviceman's divorce statute which deems servicemen stationed
there over a year residents of the state.43 Assuming the defendant was correct in
contending neither party was domiciled in New Mexico the court held it still had
jurisdiction to grant the divorce. It was further stated:
...
We are fully cognizant of the fact that holding a domiciliary intent
could be conclusively presumed from a period of residence was tantamount
to a repudiation of the theory that domicile is the ouly jurisdictional basis
for divorce. It is within the power of the legislature to establish reasonable
bases of jurisdiction other than domicile.

37. 325 U.S. at 229.
38. Alton v. Alton, supra note 36, at 681 (dissenting opinion).
39. 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
40. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT. § 1147 (2).
41. 205 Misc. at 844, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
42. 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
43. N.M. STAT. AxN. § 22-7-4 (1953) reads in part, as follows:
...persons 4erving in any military branch of the United States government
who have been continuously stationed in any military base or installation in
the state of New Mexico for such period of one (1) year, shall for the
purposes hereof, be deemed residents in good faith of the state and county
where such military base or installation is located.
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The United States Supreme Court has never held that domicile of one
of the parties is the only jurisdictional basis for divorce. This court is convinced that the concept of domicile is not entitled to constitutional

sanctity....
The traditionally domiciliary requirement is designed to prevent divorceminded couples from shopping for favorable residence requirements. The
44
concept of domicile has been notably unsuccessful in achieving this goal.
These two cases could start a trend away from domicile as the only basis for
divorce jurisdiction. However, even these cases base divorce jurisdiction on some
connection with the granting state. Both cases find that the connection required in
their statutes was such that the state had a substantial interest. The Wallace case
states:
New Mexico has a much more intimate connection with service families
who resided here for one year than the 'six-weeks divorce' states ever
achieve with most of their alleged domicilaries. 4 5
The David-Zieseniss case claimed to have found as much interest in the marrying
46
state as existed in the state of domicile.
Should Missouri courts decide that domicile is not the only basis for divorce
jurisdiction, and if this has been a determining factor in their prior decisions in
the interpretation of Missouri jurisdictional requirements for divorce, they could
decide that section 452.050 is independent and apart from section 452.040 and that
when the offense occurred in Missouri or while one or both parties resided there,
no domicile or residence requirement in Missouri is necessary. It seems unlikely
that the courts would so decide. Even the Wallace case required a reasonable basis
of divorce jurisdiction-some connection with the state.4 7 It could be questioned
whether the occurrence of the offense in Missouri or its occurrence while the parties
reside there, would be such a connection with Missouri. If not, then should Missouri
allow a divorce without domicile, there could be no proper basis for divorce jurisdiction. Thus, even if the Missouri courts decide that domicile is not always constitutionally required, they will, under the present statutes, continue to interpret section
452.050 together with section 452.040 and require residence, the equivalent of domicile,
for Missouri divorces.
JAZES KsEm

PREmvrT

FINANCE CHARGES OR TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
IN INSTALLMENT SALES-USURY?
I. THE

PROBLEM

In the recent case of Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.' the Arkansas supreme
court held that the sale of certain merchandise for a credit price exceeding the cash

44. 63 N.M. at 416-17, 320 P.2d at 1022-23
45. Id. at 418, 320 P.2d at 1023.
46. 205 Misc. at 844, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
47. 63 N.M. at 416, 417, 320 P.2d at 1022, 1023.
1. 308 S.W.2d 802 (Ark. 1957).
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price was usury, if this difference exceeded the maximum rate of interest allowed
by the state constitution. This case followed Hare v. General Contract Purclmse
Corp. 2 where the court prospectively overruled a long line of Arkansas cases 8
holding that the difference between a cash price and a credit price did not come
within the constitutional provisions relating to usury.
In the Sloan case Sears, Roebuck and Co. had sold a tractor and some automobile
tires to Sloan for a total price, less trade-in of $393.98. This figure was designated
as the "total cash price." $37.17 was added to this amount as a "carrying charge"
making a total price of $431.15. There was a cash payment of $40.00 leaving a
balance of $391.15. The remaining amount was to be paid off by equal monthly
installments of $22.00. This carrying charge was found to be in excess of the con4
stitutional maximum of ten percent per annum.
Perhaps the more important of the two cases in view of its effect on previous
decisions was the Hare case. This case recognized the doctrine that the seller might
have a higher price for credit and then said, "but there may be a question of fact
as to whether the so-called credit price was bona fide as such, or only a cloak for
usury." 5 The court then looked at what appeared to be a typical installment sale
of a motor vehicle and found a usurious transaction. The court recognized its sharp
break with the past and emphasized that its purpose was to keep the spirit of the
ban against usury abreast of present day commercial transactions.
Before proceeding further, it might be worthwhile to examine this difference
between a cash and credit price in a little more detail. In the bargaining process
that often precedes a sale some prospective vendors make it known that they would
be willing to accept one price if cash is to be paid when the transaction is closed
and another, higher price if payment is to be deferred for some period of time.
This difference between the higher credit price and the lower cash price is usually
known as the time price differential.
Perhaps the most common example of this situation would be two parties bargaining over the price of an item of merchandise. The seller may have offered to
accept one price which the buyer refused. The seller might then say, "I'll take ten
per cent less if you will pay cash." This ten per cent discount would then be the
time price differential. Another common situation is the relation of the wholesaler
to the retailer. Often the custom of the trade requires the wholesaler to extend
credit for thirty days. The wholesaler may then offer a two percent discount if
the account is paid in ten days or charge the full price if the account is paid in thirty.

2. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
3. Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 211 Ark. 526, 201 S.W.2d 757
(1947); Harper v. Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 164 S.W.2d 995 (1942); General Contract
Purchase Corp. v. Holland, 196 Ark. 675, 119 S.W.2d 535 (1938); Cheairs v. McDermott
Motor Co., 175 Ark. 1126, 2 S.W.2d 1111 (1928); Standard Motors Fin. Co. v. Mitchell
Auto Co., 173 Ark. 875, 293 S.W. 1026 (1927); Smith v. Kaufman, 145 Ark. 548. 224
S.W. 978 (1920).
4. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13.
5. 220 Ark. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
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This two percent is a time price differential. In both of these cases, one tends to
think in terms of a discount for cash payment rather than in terms of interest upon
deferred payment.
However, the situation most frequently presented to the courts is somewhat
different. It would appear that in most cases the cash price has been arrived at
first and an amount expressed in terms of dollars is added for deferred payment.6
This figure is usually expressed as a "finance" or "carrying" charge. This difference
becomes significant only when the period for deferred payment is known. When
we know the amount of the price if cash is paid, the amount added for credit, and
the period for which credit is extended we are able to compute the cost of this
credit in the same way that interest may be computed on the loan of money.
A relatively recent innovation in credit financing is the revolving charge account,
which is gaining in popularity among the larger department stores. It operates
very much like a regular charge account except that payments may be spread out
over a period of months. A line of credit is extended to a customer up to a stated
amount. A monthly payment schedule may or may not be set up and a service
charge, stated either in terms of a percentage of the balance or a fixed or sliding
dollar charge on the amount of credit used, is provided for. Under this plan the
credit may be extended for an indefinite period of time. The typical charge for
such credit usually runs about one and one half percent per month on the ending
balance. While no cases have been discovered which deal with this type of transaction, it is common business practice to treat these accounts as credit sales and not
subject to the usury statutes. This position seems difficult to justify in view of the
fact that no pretense is made of adding to the price of individual items for deferred
payment. The charge is usually stated as a percentage of the unpaid balance, which
certainly seems more in the nature of interest than a time price addition on
merchandise.
The problem with these transactions arises when this time price differential
exceeds the amount of interest allowed under the usury statues for the loan of an
amount of money equal to the cash price. The Missouri usury statute 7 provides for
interest at the rate of eight percent per annum. Thus if A loans B $100 for one year
he may charge only eight dollars for the use of that money for the year.8 But,
suppose A offers to sell B an overcoat for $100 cash or for $110 if credit is extended
for one year? Perhaps the coat is priced at $110 and A offers to accept $100 cash. Is
this difference to be considered interest and thus subject to the usury statutes? Or,
is this difference merely an addition to the margin of profit that the vendor obtains
from the sale and thus free from the restrictions imposed by usury statutes?

6. See Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra note 1; Hare v. General Contract
Purchase Corp., supra note 2.
7. § 408.030, RSMo 1949.
8. In order to simplify the example, only the general usury statute is considered here. The Missouri small loan act is considered later in this Comment.
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11. Tx TADTONAL Vi.w
A. Application Generally
The general view today seems to be that such time price differential is not
"interest" as the term "interest" is used in most general usury statutes. 9
Apparently the first case to discuss this problem was Dewar v. Span,1o where
there was at least dictum to the effect that such a time price differential would
constitute usury if it exceeded the statutory rate. However, this case was not
followed and the English case of Beete v. Bidgood,"1 in 1827, held that the sale of
a plantation at a greater price for credit than for cash was not usury even though
the difference between the two prices was greater than the rate of interest allowed
by the usury statute of that day.
The leading American case is Hogg v. Ruffner12 in which the United States
Supreme Court adopted the view that a seller had an absolute right to fix one price
for cash and another for credit. This view has been generally followed in this
countryla and has been challenged only since the great boom in installment buying
of consumer goods which began after World War I. In general, courts following the
traditional rule emphasize that they will go to the substance of a transaction to
discover usury, but if there is a bona fide sale, the usury statutes do not apply
14
since there is no loan or forbearance of money.
One of the most frequently advanced reasons for this view is that the usury
statutes were enacted to protect the borrower who was in need of cash for bare
subsistence.' 5 This borrower was in no position to bargain over the terms of the loan.
At the time these statutes were enacted, the typical purchase involving a deferred
payment was a commercial transaction. In this situation the purchaser and seller
were in relatively equal bargaining positions. Thus, if the purchaser did not find
the terms satisfactory, he could simply refrain from buying and was not in need
of the protection of the usury statutes. Whether the position of the credit purchaser
of that era is analogous to the position of the modern installment buyer will be
considered later in this Comment.
Another possible reason for this limitation on the application of the usury
statutes is that such acts impinge upon the freedom of the parties to contract as they
see fit, and therefore should be strictly construed.1 6 It is sometimes emphasized that

9. E.g., § 408.030, RSMo 1949.
10. 3 T.R. 425, 100 Eng. Rep. 656 (K.B. 1789).
11. 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
12. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 390 (1861).
13. E.g., Bell v. Idaho Fin. Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255 P.2d 715 (1953); Brooks v.
Auto Wholesalers, Inc., 101 A.2d 255 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953). See Annot., 143
A.L.R. 238 (1943).
14. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W.
425 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
15. Ibid.
16. See Berger, Usury In Installment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTMEP. PROB. 148 (1935).
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a loan of money was all that was intended to be protected.17 In some jurisdictions
usury is punished by a forfeiture and courts are reluctant to impose such a penalty
except in very clear cases.18 Perhaps another reason is the recognition that the
statutory rate is often inadequate to compensate the seller for the risks involved in
transactions of this nature.' 9 While this last reason is seldom if ever stated by a
court in its opinion, as a practical matter it surely affects the decisions.
B. Application in Missouri
The only Missouri decisions directly in point in this area have been by the
courts of appeals. These cases have supported the traditional view that the time
20
price differential is not subject to the usury statutes.
The Missouri supreme court has never definitely passed on this issue, but in an
early decision it indicated by dictum that the parties could contract in such a way
as to avoid the taint of usury in a contract for the sale of land, although they had
failed to do so in that instance.2 ' In a more recent case the court held that the sale
22
of notes did not fall within the usury statute.
The leading Missouri case is General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich 2s
where the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the installment financing of an
automobile did not fall within the usury statute in force at that time (presently in
force as Section 408.030, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949)).
Shortly after the Weinrich case the Springfield Court of Appeals, in H!ollandO'Neil Milling Co. v. Rawlings,2 4 applied this view to the sale of stock in an automobile agency where the price of the stock had been increased by an amount
approximately equal to the estimated income of the firm for the period that payment
was to be delayed. These two cases have been frequently cited and have been
followed in Missouri as recently as 1951 in General Contract Purchase Corp. v.
25

Propst.

Missouri courts have long emphasized that they will go to the substance of the
transaction to determine if usury is present. 26 An interesting case in this area is
White v. Anderson,27 where the plaintiff sold coupon books which could be redeemed
for merchandise at local stores. Plaintiff sold defendent two books, each of which
17. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, 239 S.W.2d 563 (Spr. Ct. App.
1951).
18. Berger, supra note 16.
19. Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in Installment Sales:"2 LAw & CoNTmrs. PRos.
173, 185 (1935).
20. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, supra note 17; Personal Fin.
Co. v. Endicott, 238 S.W.2d 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951); Holland-O'Neil Milling Co. v.
Rawlings, 217 Mo. App. 466, 268 S.W. 683 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note 14.
21. Mitchell v. Griffith, 22 Mo. 515 (1856).
22. Webster v. Sterling Fin. Co., 355 Mo. 193, 195 S.W.2d 509 (1946).
23. 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
24. 217 Mo. App. 466, 268 S.W. 683 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925).
25. 239 S.W.2d 563 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
26. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Boatmen's Savings Institution, 48 Mo. 189
(1871).
27. 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912).
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could be redeemed for ten dollars worth of merchandise, and received in exchange
for each book a note for ten dollars and fifty cents, due in thirty days. Plaintiff
then redeemed the books from the local merchants for ten per cent off of their face
value of ten dollars. The court made it clear that "if it has not in it the element of
a loan, there cannot be usury."28 But, in holding the transaction usurious, the
court went on to say that "the transaction was no less than if plaintiff had gone
to the store with defendent and then and there paid the merchant for the coat and
taken defendent's note just as he did take it."29
As a practical matter the similarities between the transaction in White v. Anderson and the typical installment sales contract are quite striking. First, the borrower
does not receive any loan of money, in either instance. In the White case he received
a book of coupons which had a value to him only to the extent that they could
be exchanged for merchandise. In the installment sale of modem consumer goods
the purchaser receives the goods directly, but the effect of the transaction is the
same. Secondly, in the White case, as in the typical installment sale, there was a
three party transaction. There was a buyer, a seller, and a third party supplier of
the funds to consummate the transaction. In the White case the supplier of funds
approved the credit risk in advance, while in the typical installment sale the finance
company or other supplier of funds does not approve the risk until after the note
is executed. However, this latter distinction is more apparent than real. Where
the retailer is accustomed to dealing with a supplier of funds, he is reasonably
certain that each credit risk is going to be accepted. He must have a reliable source
of money if he is to do a regular installment business and cannot afford to be
caught holding large amounts of installment paper that he cannot get his money
out of. If the retailer has any doubts about the acceptability of a credit risk, it is
always possible to check with the supplier of funds to determine if the purchaserborrower is an acceptable credit risk. It is not inconceivable that the retailer might
enter an agreement whereby the supplier of funds agrees to take all such installment
paper and allow the retailer to pass on these risks. If the retailer carries his own
paper, this problem of prior approval is eliminated, since the retailer is both seller
and supplier of funds.30 Other similarities between the transaction in the White case
and the typical installment contract occur in the flow of cash. The seller in both
instances gets the money for his merchandise from the third party and the borrower
pays the amount that he owes to this third party supplier of capital.
The court, in White v. Anderson, made reference to the fact that defendent
"bought" 3' his book of coupons, which would indicate a recognition that sales could,

28.
29.
30.
in this
31.

Id. at 136, 147 S.W. at 1123.
Id. at 138, 147 S.W. at 1123-24.
The nature of the funds supplied for credit transactions is discussed later
Comment.
164 Mo. App. at 138, 147 S.W. at 1123.
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under certain conditions, fall within the usury statute. Thus, transactions other than
the simple giving of a note in exchange for money could result in interest as the
term was used in the usury statute. However, in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Weinrich this case was cited for its language that there must be an element of a
loan in the transaction for the usury statutes to apply, without regard to the fact
that the court in White v. Anderson found a loan in a transaction somewhat analogus to the Weinrich installment credit sale.
In the recent case of Anderson v. Curls

32

the Kansas City Court of Appeals once

again emphasized that it would look behind a transaction to find usury. Anderson
gave a note for four hundred dollars which was promptly sold for two hundred
dollars. The two hundred dollars was then paid to Anderson, less a twenty dollars
commission for obtaining the loan and a five dollar recording fee for a deed of
trust. The court held this transaction usurious
It may be concluded that there is at least a possibility the Missouri courts might
be willing to look more closely at the mechanics of present day installment financing,
to determine if usury is present. Certainly the real positions of the parties to present
day installment sales more closely resemble the example drawn by the court in
White v. Anderson than the traditional situation of two parties of equal bargaining
strength, bargaining over the price of an item and agreeing on a price with a discount
for cash.

III.

THE MODERN VIEW

A. General Statement of the Moderm View
The proponents of the view that credit sales may be subject to applicable usury
33
statutes do not attempt to sweep away the entire concept of a bona fide credit price.
It is not contentedthat all such sales are or should be subject to the usury statutes,
but rather that the typical installment sale today is not a bona fide credit sale in the
4

3
Thus the arguments
sense that the concept was developed in the early cases.
advanced for this view should be regarded primarily as an attempt to view each credit
sale in the light of our present day economic structure rather than that of the

nineteenth century.
This problem has been considered and the modern view advocated in law reviews
35
However, the first case to lend support to this view was not
for some years.
decided unitl 1944.36 Since that time the trend among courts considering the problem
has been to examine installment sales more closely and to find usury even where there

32.
33.
34.
453, 108

309 S.W.2d 692 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 390 (1861); Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C.
Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).

35. See Symposium-Instalment Selling, 2

LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

139-284 (1935)

for a complete discussion.
36. Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
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has been an actual sale.37 Of course the most far reaching of these decisions have
occurred in Arkansas since the Hare case discussed earlier in this Comment. At least
one federal court has also found usury in what appears to be a typical installment
38
sale of an automobile.
A number of arguments may be advanced in favor of the modern view. The first
of these evolves from the frequently made statement that the usury statutes were
enacted to protect the needy borrower and that his situation is unlike that of the
prospective purchaser who can refrain from making the purchase. This is no doubt
true, but is the present day credit purchaser's position so radically different from the
cash borrower whom the statutes seek to protect? In the purchase of modem day
necessities-automobiles, home appliances, and even food-the needy individual will
be more likely to make a credit purchase than to seek a short term loan of cash. It is
quite clear that certainly not all credit purchases are made for such necessities, but
it is equally clear that not all loans of money go to buy these necessities. The courts
have not attempted to establish the need of the borrower in the ordinary loan,
for obvious reasons, and there seems to be no more justification for such an attempt
in the case of the credit sale. Circumstances of dire need are as likely to exist in the
case of the credit buyer as in the case of the man who borrows money.
The needy individual actually has a choice of credit sources. He can obtain a
loan from a small loan company or he can purchase the needed items on the installment plan. The typical person has heard of abuses in the small loan business and is
likely to have an exaggerated and unjustified fear of doing business with them. Thus
he turns to the "easy payment plan", which in the end may cost him more than
dealing with a reputable small loan firm. In one case, 30 a purchaser made a $250
down payment on an automobile selling for $1100, leaving an $850 balance due, signed
a note in blank, and later learned that he was to pay $53.61 a month for twenty-four
months. His total obligation to the finance company in this case was $1,286.64. The
purchaser's cost to finance the $850 for two years was $436.64. The purchaser was told
that there was insurance included in the note, but he was given no evidence of
such coverage. The report containing this illustration indicated that similar complaints had been received. One Columbia, Missouri, grocery, in conjunction with a
finance company, offers a monthly charge account advertising a charge of one
dollar per month. It is further stated, "The charge is the same regardless of the

37. Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76 (1954);
Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 91 N.W.2d 19 (1958); State ex rel.
Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956); White v.
Disher, 232 N.C. 260, 59 S.E.2d 798 (1950); National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Atkinson, 254
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Mossler Acceptance Co. v. McNeal, 252 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Associates Inv. Co. v. Sosa, 241 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951); G.F.C. Corp. v. Williams, 231 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Associates
Inv. Co. v. Thomas, 210 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Associates Inv. Co. v.
Ligon, 209 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
38. Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), suppZementary
opinion, 228 F.2d 803 (1956).
39. MIssoURI CONSUMnIER FINANCE Assoc., BULL. No. 56, at 8 (August 1958).
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amount you charge." At least one patron has reported that his "service charge" has
40
run several times this one dollar amount in at least one month.
Another argument in favor of the modem view is that the purchaser is not
really in a position to bargain over a credit price. In many cases it is simply a choice
of purchasing at a stated price for cash or at a stated credit price, or more likely
simply at so much down and so much a month. In a recent catalogue from a leading
mail order house it may be noted that the credit is not figured on the cash price but
on the unpaid balance of the cash price. On the minimum balance of fifteen
dollars the credit charge is one dollar and seventy five cents, to be paid off at the
rate of five dollars per month. Computed on the basis of an annual rate this works
out to about seventy percent per year simple interest.4 1 As the amount of the
unpaid balance increases the rate decreases to an approximation of the small loan
rate. However, it is interesting to note that even at the lower rate, no decrease in the
charge is made for early payments. Thus in theory the rate could reach absured
proportions. Where the addition is figured on the unpaid balance and the amount is
fixed on a "take it or leave it" basis, it seems hardly logical to say that the purchaser
has bargained for a credit price.
Another important argument for the modem view revolves around the presence
of capital in the transaction which would not be present in a cash sale. There must
be capital to provide the seller with money for his merchandise and to take the
obligation of the purchaser. The previous discussion of White v. Anderson seems
particularly appropriate at this point. Here there is a party to the transaction whose
sole purpose is to provide funds for this transaction. 42 Furthermore, there is no need
for a separate finance company to show the presence of capital simply for the purpose
of supplying money. Suppose that a retail merchant decides to carry his own
installment credit. Assume that the merchant has a $50,000 inventory of merchandise.
As he extends his installment credit, to say $5,000, he is faced with another problem.
This installment paper is not money that he can spend to replace the merchandise
sold; he must either reduce his inventory to $45,000 or he must add $5,000 to this capital to allow him to maintain his $50,000 inventory. Thus under either approach, he has
diverted $5,000 from his normal business. Obviously a prudent business man will
count the cost of this $5,000, either in terms of interest he must pay for it, or the
profit he could earn from it if invested in his regular business. By diverting it to
this use, it can only be assumed he has made the rational decision that it is more
profitable to provide this money for the use of others, i.e., to loan this money to his
customers rather than send them to another lender. Thus he has two profitable
businesses; he sells his merchandise for a profit and then makes another profit by

40. A law student at the University of Missouri reports that his service charges
for the month of November 1958, totaled six dollars on a balance which did not
exceed $220.00 at any time during the month. He stated that all service charges had
been paid for previous months.
41. Computed using a formula given in PHELPS, USING INSTALLMENT CREDIT 22
(1955).
42. Daniel v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 38.
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lending customers the money to buy that same merchandise. These businesses are
mutually reciprocal. By selling the merchandise he has a ready source of borrowers,
and by lending the money he has an added source of buyers.
Another argument is found in the traditional willingness of the courts to look to
the substance of a transaction to determine if usury is present. This coupled with
the traditional ability of the common law courts to adjust to the society in which they
operate, presents a strong argument for the adoption of the modern view. The traditional view was adopted during a period when customer installment credit, as we
know it today, was nonexistent and the situation presented was one of two parties
bargaining from positions of relatively equal strength. In view of the great change
which has occurred in the uses of credit sales, the courts would seem to be justified
in re-examining the traditional concepts to see if they still fit today's changed
commercial practices.
B. Possible Tests for Usury Under the Modern View
It seems to be generally accepted by all courts that not all purported credit sales
are necessarily free from the taint of usury. 4a The real problem arises as to the test
to be applied to these sales to determine if they are, in fact, usurious. The traditional
view seems to be that if, at any point in the transaction, there is an actual sale of
merchandise then the whole transaction is outside the usury statutes. 44
The test applied by the courts following the tradtional view would be: Was the
sale merely a device to enable the loan to be made, or was the loan a device to
facilitate the sale? If the latter, then there is a bona fide credit sale free of the usury
statutes. 45
The courts following the newer view would not stop at this simple test, but
would separate the transaction into two parts: (1) The sale of the merchandise, and
(2) the supplying of the money for the purchase. It is this second part which
presents the difficulties. When was there an actual supplying of money and then was
there a simple negotiation of the price based on, among other things, when payment
was to be made? Certainly the courts can not go into the minds of the parties to
determine their intention in each instance; thus some objective standards are needed
to test each case. Several possible tests are suggested to determine if the parties did
intend a sale and a loan, or simple a sale at an agreed-upon price for payment at
some future date.
The first test might be to look at the type of property involved in the transaction
to determine the type of transaction to which it lends itself. There seems to be one
very real but frequently overlooked distinction in the classes of property involved in
time price differential cases. This distinction is between property which is in itself

43. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W.
425 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
44. Ibid.
45. See cases cited note 20 supra.
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productive of revenue (e.g., farms and businesses) and property which is not productive of revenue in itself (e.g., today's consumer goods). The early cases laying
down the majority rule that a credit sale was outside the scope of the usury statutes
seem to have concerned only property which was by its nature productive of
4 6

revenue.

This type of transaction seems to be best described in the Missouri case of
Holland-O'Neil Milling Co. v. Rawlings. In that case stock in a going automobile
agency was sold to defendant Rawlings. A cash price was fixed for the stock, but
Rawlings was not in a position to pay cash. The business had never failed to earn a
twenty per cent return on what was stated as the cash price, and both parties seem to
have expected this return to continue. The vendor may be reasonably expected, in a
case of this nature, to take the position that it would be foolish to give up an investment which returns him twenty per cent a year and allow the vendee to reap this
return while the vendor supplied the capital. Thus the vendor may wish to transfer
these shares of stock to the vendee, giving the vendee control of the business, but
retaining the expected earnings from these shares until such time as they are paid for.
Thus the vendee has the control that he seeks and the vendor retains his income from
these shares until his capital is returned. This line of reasoning is even more clearly
indicated by the fact that the contract in the Holland case called for a reduction
of the time price difference in relation to the early payment of the price of the stock.
This seems to be an entirely logical arrangement for the parties. The vendor
retains the income from his capital until that capital is in his hands, and the new
owner has the opportunity to increase the profits of the business according to his own
abilities. There seems to be no objection to a further charge against the vendee to
compensate the vendor for the possible loss of his capital and other expenses in
administering the obligation. It might be argued that some of this return represents a
wage paid for actual management of the business as distinguished from a return of
capital wisely invested. However, this need not present any serious difficulty. When
the vendor withdraws from the actual operation of the business he no longer expects
to be paid for that management effort but expects only a return on his capital
investment. The amount which is returned on capital and the amount which is the
result of wages of management are matters of bargaining between the parties based
on information that they possess in any given situation.
However, a completely different situation is presented by the common practice
of installment selling of consumer goods today. Consumer goods literally or figuratively sit on the shelves of the merchants; they earn him no profit unless he can
sell them. The prospective customer comes into the merchant's place of business and
desires to make a purchase but lacks the funds. The merchant desires to make this
sale and says, in effect, "I will supply the money for this purchase if you will buy."
His motives are obvious; if he does not sell the merchandise at this time the customer
may decide not to buy at all.

46. Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827) (plantation);
Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 390 (1861) (agricultural rental property).
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Thus the consumer goods of today lend themselves to a two-part transaction
whereby the merchant both sells the goods and supplies, or makes arrangments for,
the money to be used in the transaction. On the other hand, income-producing
property is an investment which provides an annual return through dividends or
rentals. In many cases this return would be greater than the legal rate of interest.
In such a situation it would be absurd to expect the seller to give up this income
and receive only the legal rate of interest on his investment. This test will usually
serve to protect the weak buyer and still give business men the opportunity to
bargain among themselves as they see fit.
A second test which the courts might apply is related to the type of sale that is
involved. Is this a sale between two parties, neither of whom ordinarily deals in this
item or is it a stock in trade of one of the parties? Where only one sale of this type
is comtemplated, it is much more likely that the parties have negotiated a price based
on the value of the product and the terms of payment. Where one of the parties
customarily deals in the item it seems more likely that he has consciously or unconsciously determined a selling price based on a cash payment and then computed his
costs if he must supply the money for the transaction by extending credit for some
period of time.
Third, it is possibly for the court to look at the relative bargaining positions of
the parties. Common practice would indicate that, while a person might bargain on
the price of a car or a stove in dealing with a retailer, the average consumer so
little understands the costs of installment buying that he could not intelligently
bargain on this matter if he wished to. He is most often presented with a simple
"take it or leave it" choice when it comes to finance terms. The typical buyer
considers the transaction finished when the price is agreed upon and is largely at
the mercy of the seller who may adjust his credit terms in the loan part of the
transaction and thereby recoup the profit he has apparently given away in the
bargaining over price
These tests should provide an adequate basis to distinguish between those
situations where parties have arrived at a higher price for credit than for cash
through the traditional bargaining process, and those situations where the seller is,
in effect, operating a loan agency as well as his regular business.
C. Effect of the Moderm. View if Adopted in Missouri
If the Missouri courts should decide that the time price differential in some credit
sales was interest and thus subject to the usury statutes, a number of serious
questions would be raised as to the status of all credit transactions in the state.
The general Missouri usury statute provides that parties may contract, in writing,
for interest not to exceed eight percent per annum.4 7 If a greater rate than this is
charged, the chattel mortgage will be invalidated and the borrower may recover the

47.

§ 408.030, RSMo 1949.
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48
If the lender is a
amount paid in excess of the legal rate and his attorney's fee.
the entire interest
system
bank or trust company and a member of the federal reserve
49
amount.
twice
that
of
is forfeited and the borrower may recover a penalty

By proper handling of the transactions, the credit seller and lender could come
50
within the terms of the Missouri small loan act. However, this would affect only the
first $400.00 of any transaction, and also would raise the problem of the ability of the
typical sales clerk to handle the transaction correctly. This would be particularly
5
important since an error could render the entire note and lien void. '
Clearly a serious problem would be created as to existing obligations
Missouri supreme court should adopt the modern view. The most serious
would probably be the loss of chattel mortgages on automobiles and durable
It is also quite likely that a large amount of litigation would develop. This
probably continue until the bar and the lenders understood the full import

if the
aspect
goods.
would
of the

decision and the requirements laid down by it. Because of this any reversal of the
present view might take the form of a caveat. This was the form of decision used by
the Arkansas court in Hare v. General ContractPurchase Corp.
D. Problems Raised by Adoption of the Moderm View
A decision to the effect that an installment sale was usurious would raise other
questions. What of the wholesaler who offers a two percent discount if paid within
ten days, with the full amount due in thirty days? A possible answer might be that
through custom of the trade the wholesaler must extend credit for thirty days and
the discount is an attempt to avoid this business obligation. His action might be
treated as an attempt to avoid being a lender. What of the five percent penalty
which some utility companies add to bills which are not paid by the tenth of the
month? What of the retailer who choose to sell to all customers on credit and fixes
his prices accordingly? What if he gives a discount for cash payments? What if he
gives no discount? An attempt to answer these questions at the present time would
be little more than speculation. They are raised only to illustrate possible problems
which might develop.
IV.

THE LEGIsLATIVE APPROACH

Several legislatures have attempted to solve the problem of retail installment
sales. Most states which have enacted legislation in this area seem to have restricted
52
Indiana's
their regulation of maximum rates of return to motor vehicle sales.
statute provided for administrative fixing of the rates of return on installment
53
The
contracts by establishing the price at which these contracts could be sold.

48. §§ 408.050-.070, RSMo 1949.
49. §§ 362.280, 363.630, RSMo 1949.
50. §§ 408.100-.190, RSMo 1957 Supp.
51. § 408.150, RSMo 1957 Supp.
52. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, §§ 249-59 (Supp. 1957);
83, §§ 116-40 (1957); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 218.01 (1957).
53. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-901-45 (1951).
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portion of the statute providing for administrative regulation of prices was held

unconstitutional by the Indiana supreme court.54 This appears to be the only statute
attempting to regulate rates which has been successfully attacked. Other states have
enacted legislation which fixes maximum rates of return on all retail installment sales
contracts. 55 Apparently the most recent action in this area has been by Kansas which
enacted a comprehensive sales finance act in 1958 covering all retail sales agreements.56
In general these statutes have provided for a return of so many dollars on each
hundred dollars outstanding, depending on the age of the automobile or cost of
merchandise. They have also provided a certain minimum fee for any such transaction.
Could such a law be enacted in Missouri? At least one possible constitutional
7
problem is raised. The Missouri constitution provides for uniform interest rates.
It forbids the classification of lenders and provides that any rate of interest fixed
by law must apply to all lenders generally. This might present a problem in any
attempt to draft a statute that would apply only to installment credit. A legislative
declaration to the effect that this time price differential did not constitute interest
might be sufficient. Such a declaration would give the Missouri supreme court another reason for not upsetting the previous holdings by the courts of appeals that

54. Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1952).
55. N.Y. PEas. PRop. LAW §§ 301-11, 401-18 (Supp. 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §
15-1-2(a) (1953).
56. Kan. Laws Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9. The provisions of section 8 establishing
the maximum allowable return, which are typical of this species of statute, are set
out below:
Section 8(a) ...
(I) As to motor vehicles:
Class 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a
year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made-seven dollars
($7) per one hundred dollars ($100) per year.
Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1 and any used motor
vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or
not more than two (2) years [prior ?] to the year in which the sale is madeten dollars ($10) per one hundred dollars ($100) per year.
Class 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated by the
manufacturer of a year model more than two (2) years prior to the year in
which the sale is made-thirteen dollars ($13) per one hundred dollars
($100) per year.
(H) As to services and goods other than motor vehicles:
(i) On so much of the principal balance as does not exceed three hundred dollars ($300), twelve dollars ($12) per one hundred dollars ($100) per
year; (ii) if the principal balance exceeds three hundred dollars ($300), but
is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), nine dollars ($9) per one hundred
dollars ($100) per year on that portion over three hundred dollars ($300);
(iii) if the principal balance exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000), eight
dollars ($8) per one hundred dollars ($100) per year on that portion over one
thousand dollars ($1,000).
Section 8(b) . . . A minimum finance charge of fifteen dollars ($15) may be
charged on any retail installment transaction.
57. Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 44.
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the time price differential was not interest.58 However, such a course by the legislature would leave any proposed statute open to attack on the basis of legislative price
fixing. Whether either of these attacks would be suficient to make the statute
unconstitutional is beyond the scope of this Comment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While the view that the time price differential is interest within the meaning of
the usury statutes has only limited support among the courts of this country, it seems
to be the most logical view. The analogy of the needy installment-plan buyer to the
needy borrowers of cash seems clear. If the usury statute was designed to protect
the person in need of funds, why should not it also protect that person who is in need
of the objects that those funds will purchase? Should the person who must own an
automobile to continue his employment be protected if he borrows the money to buy
the car but unprotected if he buys the car on an installment plan?
Looking further it may be seen that the same kind of capital is present to finance
installment purchases as is available for ordinary loans. The same factors are
included in determining the rate that must be charged. These are pure interest or
profit, administrative costs of the transaction, and bad debt or credit losses. 5 9 While
these factors may vary according to the transaction they are always present in either
installment sales or pure. rins of money.
The present day installment sale is a transaction which did not exist fifty years
ago. Should the old rules be applied to this class of transactions without considering
that these sales may be something entirely different from the transactions which the
idea of a bona fide credit sale was meant to cover? If the usury statute is to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted, should it not be tested against the
present day commercial world instead of fifty years ago?
However, it should be noted that the adoption of the minority view will be no
panacea for the problems affecting installment selling. A real problem is presented by
the present statutory rate of eight percent per annum. It seems obvious that eight
percent per annum is not a sufficient return to attract the capital necessary to finance
installment credit. The problem of what is a fair rate of return is much more difficult
to answer. Certainly the customers, costs and security involved seem to resemble
more closely the small loan customer than any other group of people. Few people
would question the value of the small loan acts and much the same situation would
seem to exist in regard to installment credit insofar as a fair rate of return is involved.
The best solution to the problem would seem to be in the hands of the legislature. It alone is in a position to prevent the abuses to which this area is susceptible
and at the same time provide for a fair rate of return on investment in financing
credit sales.

58.
59.

See cases cited note 20 supra.
See PHELPS, USING INSTALLMENT CREDIT 18 (1955).
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The Kansas act could well serve as a model for any action by Missouri. It
might well be that a lower minimum fee would be in order since the fifteen dollar
minimum provided by the Kansas act provides little protection for the small
purchaser. Such a minimum fee could be applied, with equal logic, to the existing
small loan legislation since the problem of high costs in relation to a very small loan
is much the same.
Assuming such legislation could avoid the constitutional problems mentioned
earlier it would provide protection where needed, allow a fair return on capital,
and avoid the abuses of a few unscrupulous operators who injure the reputation of
reputable firms.
If such legislation is not enacted, the Missouri supreme court is faced with two
choices if a case involving usury in a credit sale is brought before it. It might allow
the old rule to stand, unmodified. This would have the effect of allowing abuses
to continue and would leave any remedy to the legislature. Or the court could
modify the old rule, which would end the abuses but might very well create a
problem, remediable only by the legislature, of providing a fair rate of return for
the financing of installment sales. There are several factors which might influence
the court's thinking in this matter. The courts seem to have created the traditional
rule to exempt a group of persons who did not need the protection of the usury
statutes. It seems equally just that they modify this rule to bring under the protection of the usury statutes this new group which seems to have a real need for such
protection.
It is the legislature which has fixed the maximum interest rate to be charged
a borrower. In theory this rate should be set in such a way as to protect the weak
and still provide an adequate return on the lender's investment. The establishment
of the rate is clearly a legislative matter.
Thus it seems the problem is one that can be adequately solved only by
legislation. This does not seem to be a sufficient reason to say that the courts
should not act to provide such relief as they are capable of giving. It would seem
that the supreme court has only two choices. It may, in effect, establish a maximum
rate that is too low, or it may allow an unrestricted return on installment selling.
Faced with these two alternative solutions, neither of which is entirely acceptable,
it would seem more in the interests of justice to resolve doubts in favor of the
retail installment buyers-that group which is least able to protect itself.
JAZsS R. WILLARD

INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
FOR THE SALE OF LAND IN MISSOURI
L DEED OF TRUST-USUAL PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY DEVICE IN MISSOURI
The person who incurs a large debt in connection with a purchase of real
estate will be required in most instances to give his creditor a security interest in
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the property. In Missouri the most common type of security used for this purpose

is a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage with foreclosure by non-judicial
sale pursuant to a power of sale.' When this device is used, the purchaser executes
a promissory note to his creditor to evidence the debt, and a mortgage or deed of
trust is executed in favor of the noteholder. 2 The mortgage or deed of trust operates
as a lien against the realty, with title and the beneficial rights of ownership remaining in the mortgagor 3 as long as there is no default under the terms of the instru4
ment.
If the debt is paid as provided in the note, the security interest is released by
marginal release, 5 and the mortgagor's title is freed of the lien without a reconveyance being necessary. 6 Should the mortgagor fail to pay the debt in the manner
provided in the mortgage or deed of trust, the security interest can be realized
on and the land sold to satisfy the debt. 7 If the sale complies with the terms of
the instrument and the statute,8 the mortgagors interest in the land is extinguished 9
and the purchaser at the sale takes a title valid as against all parties to the foreclosure proceeding.' 0 The cost of the sale and amount of debt secured are taken out
1. A power of foreclosure by non-judicial sale in a deed of trust or mortgage
is a lawful provision and is a matter of contract between the parties. §§ 443.190, .410,
RSMo 1949; Abrams v. Lakewood Park Cemetery Ass'n, 355 Mo. 313, 196 S.W.2d 278
(1946) (en banc).
2. The deed of trust or mortgage is security for the debt which is evidenced
by the promissory note. Park Natl Bank of Kansas City v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
184 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1950); Eurengy v. Equitable Realty Corp., 341 Mo. 341, 107
S.W.2d 68 (1937); Allen v. Pullam, 223 Mo. App. 1053, 10 S.W.2d 64 (Spr. Ct. App.
1928).
3. In re Thomasson's Estate, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553 (1943) (en bane);
Reynolds v. Stepanek, 339 Mo. 804, 99 S.W.2d 65 (1936); Missouri Real Estate & Loan
Co. v. Gibson, 282 Mo. 75, 220 S.W. 675 (1920); Kenneth v. Plummer, 28 Mo. 142
(1859); Mansur, Real Estate Mortgage Theory in. Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 200 (1941);
Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938-Property, 4 Mo. L.
REv. 419 (1939).
4. Wakefield v. Dinger, 234 Mo. App. 407, 135 S.W.2d 17 (Spr. Ct. App. 1939); 1
JONES, MORTGAGES § 41 (8th ed. 1928).
5. §§ 443.060, .070, .090, .100, RSMo 1949.
6. McGehee v. Garringer, 284 Mo. 465, 224 S.W. 828 (1920) (en banc); Brown v.
Merchant's Bank, 66 Mo. App. 427 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896).
7. The same type sale, i.e., at public auction after published notice, is held in
the case of non-judicial foreclosure as is used when the foreclosure is by court
action. Thielecke v. Davis, 260 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1953); Petring v. Kuhs, 350 Mo.
1197, 171 S.W.2d 635 (1943); Lunsford v. Davis, .300 Mo. 508, 254 S.W. 878 (1923);
Waples v. Jones, 62 Mo. 440 (1876).
8. The sale must be held in the county where the property lies. § 443.310,
RSMo 1949.
9. This is subject to an exception where the noteholder is the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale. When that happens, the mortgagor has a limited statutory right
of redemption. § 443.410, RSMo 1949. See generally Wise, Foreclosure by Power of
Sale Inserted in a Mortgage or Deed of Trust, 4 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1939); Note, 1950
WASH. U.L.Q. 617.
10. § 443.290, RSMo 1949, provides for good title in case of sale by a mortgagee.
Court interpretation has extended this rule to a sale by trustee. Notwithstanding
this statute, it is still possible to have the sale set aside for irregularity. See cases
collected in VERNoN's AwN. Mo. STAT. 1949 § 443.290 nn.32-33; Annot., 3 RSMo 1949,
§ 443.290, at 1469-75.
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of the proceeds first; then if there is any surplus, that amount is returned to the
holder of the equity of redemption."
The reason the mortgage or deed of trust with a power of foreclosure by nonjudicial sale is used in almost all cases in Missouri is that in case of default in
payment the noteholder has a speedy and efficient method of realizing on the
12
security, available at a relatively low cost. The time required to execute a power
13
of sale provision in a mortgage or deed of trust is less than thirty days. In the
typical case, since no court action is required, the total expense will be approximately
14
twenty-five to fifty dollars.
II. INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS AS PURCHASE MONEY DEVIcE-OUTSIDE MISSOURI

In jurisdictions which do not recognize or permit foreclosure of mortgages or
deeds of trust by non-judicial sale, 15 there is an acute problem of finding a quick
and inexpensive method of extinguishing the interest of a defaulting purchaser of
realty and realizing on the "security". One solution is the use of land installment
contracts which closely resemble the conditional sale contracts for chattels. By
the use of this type of contract the purchaser can have the advantage of a shortmargin "loan" and at the same time the vendor can have, in the case of default,
16
the substantial advantages of a foreclosure by non-judicial sale, and in some
cases the additional advantage of a windfall.
A typical transaction of this kind might be described as follows: 17
A man with an income of $300 a month, and savings amounting to $2,000,
wishes to buy a $10,000 house. A bank or home loan institution is unwilling
to lend more than $5,000 secured by a mortgage on the property. The owner
declines to take a first or second mortgage for any part of the purchase
11. In the typical situation the holder of the equity of redemption will be the
purchaser-mortgagor or his successor in title. Reid v. Mullins, 43 Mo. 306 (1869);
In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937).
12. Wise, Foreclosureby Poiberof Sale Inserted in a Mortgage or Deed of Trust,
4 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1939); Note, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 423.
13. At least twenty days of this period will be the statutory notice prior to sale
§ 443.310, RSMo 1949, Judah v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 301, 62 S.W.2d 715 (1933); Hoffman v.
Bigham, 324 Mo. 516, 24 S.W.2d 125 (1930).
14. It is assumed that the trustee has waived his right to statutory fees as
provided by § 443.360, RSMo 1949.
15. Power of foreclosure by non-judicial sale is used in only eighteen jurisdictions, judicial process being required in others. In a number of states, the use of
power of sale provision as a method of foreclosure is specifically forbidden by statute.
16. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.78 (Casner ed. 1952); Notes, 1950 U. ILL.
L.F. 249; 39 MINN. L. REV. 93 (1955); 7 RUTGERS L. REV. 396 (1953).
17. The installment contract, sometimes called "contract for deed" or "bond
for title," should be differentiated from the ordinary executory contract for the sale
of realty. The latter contract is used primarily as a more or less complete binder
agreement for the time between the date the bargain was entered and the date
the bargain is closed by the passing of title and execution of security devices, if
any., The installment contract governs the relations of the parties throughout the
life of the debt, whereas in the binder contract situation, the debt relationship after
the closing date is governed by the security device and the contract drops out of the
picture. NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMnIssIoN, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDY RELATING
TO INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS (1937).
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price. The parties thereupon enter into a contract under which the purchaser
takes possession immediately and the vendor retains title until the full
purchase price is paid, or at least until the balance of the price is reduced
to a point at which institutional financing becomes available. The parties
sign a standard agreement form providing for a total price of $10,000, $2,000
to be paid in cash at the time of the contract, the balance payable t the
rate of $75 per month, including 6% interest; taxes, special assessments na
8
fire insurance costs are charged to the buyer.'
It is clear from this transaction that title to the realty remains in the vendor and
the purchaser's interest is equitable. When all payments have been made the
purchaser will receive a conveyance of legal title and the security interest of the
vendor will be released.
The difficult problem is to define the remedy the vendor has in case the purchaser fails to make his payments and the vendor finds it necessary to realize on
his security interest. On usual contract principles it would seem the vendor could
bring suit: "(1) for the installments which are due with interest thereon; (2) for
specific performance of the contract; (3) for damages for the breach; (4) to foreclose his vendee's rights; (5) to quiet title";' 9 or if he should desire, he may merely
rescind the contract.

20

Since all of these remedies involve the use of court action, the vendor still
would not have a remedy to take care of the situation where the amount paid
prior to default was so small that court action would not be feasible, or where court
action would be too slow or expensive. To alleviate this situation the typical land
installment contract will usually contain the following provisions:
1. Time shall be of the essence;
2. Prompt payment on dates due is a condition precedent to the vendor's
21
duty to convey.
3. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer,
or upon failure to make any payments when the same shall become due
or within days thereafter, the Seller shall, at his option, be released
from all obligations in law and equity ... and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to
the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract,
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and take

18. This example is taken from Bodenheimer, Forfeitures Under Real Estate
Installment Contracts in Utah, 3 UTAH L. REV. 30 (1952), in which the author gave
acknowledgment to the Salt Lake City Title and Escrow Co. for use of their files
in procuring the same.
19. Comment, 27 CALiF. L. REV. 583 (1939).
20. Recission would rarely be used since the purchaser, unless he agreed to the
contrary, would be entitled to be put in status quo. This would mean the vendor,
to regain possession of the land, would have to return all installments paid. Thus
the vendor would be deprived of rent for the time the purchaser was in possession.
Corbin, The Right of Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40
YALE L.J. 1013, 1019-23 (1931). Cf. Haynes v. Dunstan, 104 S.W.2d 1025 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1937).
21. 3 AMPERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.78, at 196 (Casner ed. 1952).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/4

48

et al.: Editorial
MISSOURI
LAW Board/Comments
REVIEW

[Vol. 24

possession of said premises without legal process as in its first and former

estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer
thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with the
land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once
22
a tenant at will of the Seller.
If the contract is enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded, it is
clear this contract gives the vendor a very favorable remedy, much more advantageous than would be available under a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust.
The vendor is not only able to repossess the land quickly, but also retains all that
has been paid by the purchaser. 23 The further the contract proceeds toward completion, the more the purchaser will tend to be aware of seriousness of breach. Also
it is probable that the retained payments will more than cover the damages
occasioned by a breach even though there is little or no initial payment.
Unfortunately it is this possibility of forfeiture, not alleviated by the privilege
of tardy redemption, which has led to much dissatisfaction and uncertainty with an
otherwise effective instrument. When a contract of this type is viewed from the
standpoint of a purchaser it is clear there is a serious possibility of a harsh and
oppressive result. The further the contract proceeds toward completion, the more
the purchaser stands to lose and the more the vendor stands to gain from a defaultintentional or inadvertent. Thus in reality the provision for the vendor to retain
all payments as liquidated damages becomes a provision for a penalty, a thing not
24
usually sanctioned in either law or equity.
This possibility of penalty has given the courts much trouble whenever such a
contract has come before it. The result is that there are many conflicting decisions
on the issue of whether forfeiture clauses are valid. By the weight of authority
the vendor under a land installment contract with strict forfeiture provisions can
retain the payments made and recover possession of the realty from the defaulting
purchaser. 25 A minority of jurisdictions 2 6 refuse to enforce strict forfeiture provisions where a penalty would result and allow the defaulting purchaser to recover
the installments he has paid, less such amount as will compensate the vendor for
the damages he received as a result of the breach.21 Other jurisdictions, while
22. This language is taken from a real estate contract form used in Illinois.
The word "forfeited" should never be used unless the local cases clearly hold it to
be harmless. It is much better to say simply that the payments made shall be
"retained" by the seller as liquidated damages. Bodenheimer, Forfeitures Under Real
Estate Installment Contracts in Utah, 3 UTAH L. REv. 30 (1952).
23. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 791 (rev. ed. 1936).
24. Id. § 776.
25. Id. § 791; Corbin, The Right of Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of
Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1031 (1931); Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on
Land Contracts, 14 MInm. L. REv. 342, 350 (1930); Annots., 134 A.L.R. 1060 (1941),
59 A.L.R. 189 (1929).
26. 3 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 23, § 791; Simpson, Legislative Changes in
the Law of Equitable Conversion By Contract: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754, 777 (1935).
27. E.g., in Lytle v. Scottish Am. Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 468, 470, 50 S.E. 402,
406-07 (1905), the court said:
As in a mortgage, so in its equitable equivalent, a conditional sale of
land, a forfeiture will not be enforced even for the vendee's default. There
is no difficulty in making an exact computation of the damages.. . . While
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acceding to the majority view in theory, have indulged in all sorts of ameliorative
devices to avoid its full impact. 28 For the most part the courts have kept the actual
state of the law cloudy by giving unqualified recognition to the forfeiture clause in
some cases, and granting relief in other cases where the facts indicate a penalty
will result. 29 Despite the tendency of most courts to hedge, it is still possible to
find cases where strict forfeiture resulted in a heavy penalty to the purchaser. 3 0
It is this type of case which has drawn criticism from legal scholars and prompted
their advocacy of relief against such forfeiture provisions. 3 1 Relief to the defaulting
purchaser has been advocated by the American Law Institute, in its Restatement of
32

Contracts.

many courts have taken a different view of this subject, the decisions in this
State are to the effect that before the vendor on rescission can recover the
property sold, he must account for so much of the purchase money as has
been paid.
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), is probably the soundest
recent decision involving attempted forfeiture under a land installment contract.
In that case the court held the purchaser could recover the excess of his payments
above the vendor's actual damages. The purchaser had defaulted on an installment
contract with forfeiture provisions after paying $2,725 of a total purchase price of
$10,500.
28. "Strict doctrines as to forfeitures inevitably produce loose doctrines as to
'waiver.' Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity, 33 HAav. L. REv. 929, 952
(1920).
29. This is true even in jurisdictions which purportedly follow the majority rule.
For example in Illinois, where the land installment contract is a common and
acceptable device for real estate financing arrangements, it has been said that the
courts have failed to produce a clear decision which can be applied beyond the
facts of the case in which it was rendered. Note, 1950 U. ILL. L.F 249.
30. Hansborough v. Peck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 497 (1866) (forfeiture upheld though
vendee had paid $40,000 on a total purchase price of $100,000); Gregory v. Nelson,
147 Kan. 682, 78 P.2d 889 (1938) (upholding forfeiture of $15,000 on a total purchase
price of $80,000); Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackne, 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923)
(upholding forfeiture of $12,500 on a total purchase price of $50,000).
31. Practically all writings have forcefully advocated protection of the purchaser
and the rejection of the strict legal doctrines by which forfeitures have been enforced.
3 Wimisox, CONTARcTS § 791 (rev. ed. 1936); Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of
Contract, 5 Mmm. L. REv. 329 (1921); Bodenheimer, Forfeitures Under Real Estate
Installment Contracts in Utah, 3 UTAH L. REV. 30 (1952); Corbin, The Right of a
Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931);
Havighurst & Lawrence, Forfeitures Under Real Estate Contracts in Illinois, 29 ILL.
L. REV. 714 (1935); Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754 (1935); Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land
Contracts, 14 Mmx. L. REv. 342 (1930); Comment, 27 CALs'. L. REv. 583 (1939); Notes,
34 U. DEr. L.J. 209 (1956); 52 HARv. L. RFv. 129 (1939); 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 249; 39
MINN. L. REv. 93 (1955); 7 RUTGERS L. REv. 396 (1953).
32. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 357 (1932) reads, in part: § 357. Restitution in
Favor of a Plaintiff Who is Himself in Default.
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is
justified therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance
of a condition, but the plaintiff has rendered a part performance under the
contract that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff can get judgment,
except as stated in Subsection (2), for the amount of such benefit in excess
of the harm that he has caused to the defendant by his own breach, in no
case exceeding a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not wilful and deliber-
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Despite the increased use of land contracts as a security device there has been
a relatively small amount of legislation regulating them.38 Only thirteen states at
present appear to have statutes which could be applied to land installment contracts. 3 4 These statutes are largely of two types. One group grants relief against
all forfeitures and penalties, but this type statute has been considered as not applicable to the land installment contract, and thus is of little value here. The other
type statute has been enacted for the specific purpose of aiding the defaulting
purchaser in a land installment contract. The relief given is a statutory grace period
after default, with reinstatement to be allowed if the purchaser remedies his
delinquency within this time. It is submitted that as yet there has been no legislation
which gives a completely satisfactory remedy for the problems that are occasioned
by a purchaser's default on a land installment contract.8 5

III. LAND

INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS IN MISSOURI

A summary comparison will indicate that the desired end, an efficient and
inexpensive remedy, which has led to the use of land installment contracts in certain
other jurisdictions, is an achieved reality in Missouri when one uses a deed of

ate; or
(b) the defendant, with knowledge that the plaintiff's breach of duty or
non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur,
assents to the rendition of the part performance, or accepts the
benefit of it, or retains property received although its return in
specie is still not unreasonably difficult or injurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part performance
if it is merely a payment of earnest money, or if the contract provides that
it may be retained and it is not so greatly in excess of the defendant's harm
that the provision is rejected as imposing a penalty.
(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit from the plaintiff's part
performance is the amount by which he has been enriched as a result of
such performance unless the facts are those stated in subsection (1 b), in
which case it is the price fixed by the contract for such part performance,
or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of the total contract price.
The second illustration of subsection (2) reads:
7. A contracts for the sale of land to B for $5,000, payable in five annual
installments. It is provided that time shall be of the essence and that, upon
any default, A may declare the contract terminated and may retain all
installments paid. After B has paid $4,000, he is unable to make the fifth
payment on time. Upon B's default, A at once gives notice the contract is
terminated, resumes possession of the land, and sells it to C for $6,000. In an
action for restitution, B proves that A has suffered no harm other than
deprivation of rent. B can get judgment for $4,000, less the value of the use
and occupation enjoyed by him.
33. Comment, 39 MIN. L. REV. 93 (1955); NEW YORK LAW REVISION CozuzssmON,
REPORT 377 (1937).
34. AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741, 742 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3275, 3389;
GA. CODE §§ 20-1403, 37-216 (1933); IOWA CODE § 656.1-.6 (1950); LA. REv. STAT. §
9:2941 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 107, § 4 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 118(1)
(1951); MIcH. Corp. LAWS § 630.25 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1953); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 17-102, 17-704 (1947); 3 N.D. REv. CODE § 32-1801 (1943); OKLA. STAT.
AN. tit. 15, § 213 (1937); S.D. CODE § 37.3101 (1939).
35. The Maryland statute is the most recent and seemingly the most effective
enactment on this subject. The efficacy of this statute cannot be appraised until
it has had further court interpretation. A similar attempt at comprehensive legisla-
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trust with a power of sale provision. The problem in Missouri is not essentially
which type of instrument to use, because the advantages in favor of the deed of
trust with a power of sale are overwhelming. 3 6 Rather the problem is what to do
in case a lender makes the wrong choice and uses a land installment contract. Most
often the lender will use the land installment contract without having consulted a
lawyer.
At the outset it should again be made clear that what is being dealt with here
is a contract designed to take the place of the deed of trust with power of sale.
It is plainly not the ordinary contract of sale which is in common everyday use
as a binder agreement until closing date.3 7 On the binder instrument the law is
relatively well settled and will not be discussed here. On the true land installment
contract, Missouri case law is definitely meager.3 8 To make the situation more
difficult, the cases which do consider this instrument fail on close scrutiny to warrant
any broad categorical statements as to just what the law in Missouri is.39
A. Vendor's Right to Retain Payments if
There Is No Express Provision for Forfeiture
In the only Missouri cases which have dealt with the vendor's right to retain
payments where there is no express provision for forfeiture, the contract under
consideration was of the binder type as distinguished from the installment
contract.4 0 For this reason the only money sought to be retained was the down
tion failed to be adopted by New York in 1938. See NEw YORK LAW REvIsioN CoaiMISSION, RECOMIENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRAcTS 343-85
(1937)'.
36. It is not intended to suggest that a land installment contract never should
be used in Missouri as a security device. There are some special situations where
competent lawyers have advised their use notwithstanding their patent disadvantages.
One such type of case is that of the heavily promoted, highly speculative subdivision
of cheap lots, where the buyer is not apt to make improvements and is likely to
regret his bargain and default. Even the low cost of a deed of trust foreclosure may
be too much in view of the small value of the lots and the small payments made.
See the discussion of marketable title in note 76 infra.
37. Such contracts are hereinafter referred to as binder contracts. (As used
here, "binder" does not refer simply to the overly short, inadequate contract for
the sale of land, often used in Missouri.) As indicated supra note 17, this type of
contract is usually found in the majority of real estate transactions and has as its
principal purpose the governing of the rights of the parties during the typical one
or two month period intervening between the signing of the contract and the
closing of the sale. After the deed and security instruments have been executed
and delivered, this binder contract ordinarily drops completely out of the picture.
38. The principal consideration must be what the courts have done, since Missouri, like thirty-four other states, has never enacted any legislation applicable to
land installment contracts.
39. This is said with the realization that it is contrary to what appears to be
the only prior discussion of land installment contracts in Missouri. See GILL, MISSOUtli TITLES § 1659 (3d ed. 1931) where it is stated:
A contract to sell and purchase real estate where a certain number of
monthly payments are to be made before a deed will be given, is valid. A
provision in such a contract that all money paid will be forfeited upon
delinquency, is upheld (unless the forfeiture is fraudulent). ...
40. It is submitted that the disposition of the Missouri courts on this point in
the case of a binder contract would reasonably apply a fortiori to an installment
contract.
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payment made at the time the agreement was entered into. On this question, Missouri
courts hold, contrary to a majority of jurisdictions, that in order for a vendor to
regain the property, where there is no provision for forfeiture, the vendor must return
41
all payments made by the purchaser, less the vendor's actual damages.
In Haynes v. Dunstan4 2 the vendor brought ejectment to recover possession
of 451 acres of land. The land was sold to the defendant on a contract on which
defendant defaulted. The purchaser counterclaimed for $1,800 of the $2,000 in payments he had made on the contract prior to default. The court gave plaintiff-vendor
judgment for possession of the land and the purchaser the $1,800 he sought by
counterclaim. This was considered the amount purchaser paid on the contract less
the vendor's damages for the breach. The court said:
The defendant did not rescind the contract; he merely failed to perform
the terms of the contract within the times therein provided. When the
plaintiff brought this suit, he elected to rescind the contracts, and he may
not have both the land and the purchase money received by him, in the
absence of provisions in the writings to the effect that faildre of the defendant
43
to fully perform forfeited the payments made.
B. Effect of Express Forfeiture Provision on
Vendee's Right to Specific Performance
The majority of cases in which Missouri courts consider land installment contracts are suits by a purchaser for specific performance after the purchaser has
defaulted and the vendor has attempted a forfeiture.
O'Fallon. v. Kennerly44 is the earliest Missouri case in this field. There the
defendant vendor entered a bond to convey certain realty to the plaintiff, plaintiff
to pay the purchase price in stated installments. The contract contained strict provisions to the effect that if all installments were not promptly paid all prior payments
would be forfeited. The plaintiff defaulted and defendant refused to convey, claiming
the forfeiture. Notwithstanding his default plaintiff sought specific performance
claiming defendant had waived the strict forfeiture provision by accepting the first
payment after it was long overdue. The court denied relief to plaintiff on the ground
that plaintiff's proof failed to show he had ever made the payment he alleged
defendant accepted after overdue. The court, by dictum, recognized the validity
of the forfeiture provision when it said:

41. Bennett v. Adams, 238 S.W.2d 442 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951), 30 TEXAs L. Rzv.
909 (1952); Haynes v. Dunstan, 104 S.W.2d 1025 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937); Norris v.
Letchworth, 140 Mo. App. 19, 124 S.W. 559 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
42. 104 S.W.2d 1025 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
43. Id. at 1026. While the court uses the word "forfeited" it would seem
"retention of payments for liquidated damages" would be a better phrase, even
though Missouri courts have indicated the important question is the substance of
the provision rather than the words used. Yerxa v. Randazzo Macaroni Co., 315
Mo. 927, 288 S.W. 20 (1926); May v. Crawford, 150 Mo. 504, 51 S.W. 693 (1899);
RESTATEENT, ComRAcTS § 339 (Mo. Annot. 1933).
44. 45 Mo. 124 (1869). This case has been cited for the general proposition that
land installment contracts with forfeiture provisions are valid in Missouri. See
GILL, MissouRi Trrrs § 1659 (3d ed. 1931).
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There is no doubt that equity may decree a specific performance of a
contract for sale of property, notwithstanding a default in payment upon the
day specified. The books are full of instances where such relief has been
granted, and in many cases where there is an express stipulation of forfeiture. But this relief has always been afforded upon equitable principles.
It will by no means be given as a matter of course, but some circumstance
must exist to show that the party is justly entitled to it; as, for instance,
where the purchaser has gone into possession and made valuable improvements or paid a considerable portion of the purchase money, or the default'
is occassioned by the act of the vendor, or he has waived it by receiving part
of the purchase money, or otherwise, or where any other circumstances exist
that would render a forfeiture in equitable. But I have never seen a respectable case, where the contract is wholly executory and the time specific when
the purchase money shall be paid, with an express condition of forfeiture 45
if
not paid at the time. .. in which he [plaintiff] has obtained this relief.
There was another ground which precluded relief for the plaintiff, namely, that he
had failed to make a tender of the amount due.
This case, by dictum, places Missouri in line with the majority view when the
court says that unless there is some equitable ground for relief, a forfeiture provision
should be strictly enforced. This same view is stated in almost all subsequent cases
where a defaulting purchaser has sought specific performance.
Despite those decisions, specific performance in favor of defaulting purchasers
has not been denied as consistently as one might expect from the language. Since
the case of O'Fallon v. Kennerly, the issue of waiver, sought to be raised there, has
become increasingly important. This has been in large measure due to the convenience waiver presents to the courts which have been forced to deal with the strict
forfeiture provisions. If the court can find, even on slight grounds, that there has
been a waiver of the strict provisions, the tendency is to seize that as a means for
relieving against the forfeiture.
Bogad v. Wachter 4 6 is a good illustration of how waiver has become the controlling issue in cases involving forfeitures of land installment contracts. There the
suit for specific performance was brought by a purchaser in default. The plaintiff
had purchased a trailer court near Ft. Leonard Wood on a land installment contract.
The terms of the contract provided that the price was $15,000, payable $400 per
month, title to be conveyed to purchaser upon full payment. The contract also
provided:
Time is expressly made the essence of this contract and if Parties of
the Second Part fail for 30 days after any monthly installment becomes due
and payable to pay same, then this contract shall become null and void and
Party of the First Part [vendor] shall retain all payments made as liquidated
47
damages and may sell said property to other parties for their own benefit.
The plaintiff failed to make his fourth payment within the 30 day grace period
but claimed defendant accepted that payment 17 days after that period. Thereafter
45. 45 Mo. at 127-28. It is supposed that the court was speaking only in general,
since the contract before the court was not wholly executory.
46. 365 Mo. 426, 283 S.W.2d 609 (1955).
47. Id. at 427, 283 S.W.2d at 611.
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plaintiff defaulted on other payments and defendant exercised the forfeiture provisions of the contract, putting a third party in possession of the trailer camp.
Plaintiff's theory in the action for specific performance was that defendant by
accepting the fourth payment 17 days after the grace period, had waived his right
to the benefit of the strict forfeiture provisions. The evidence was not too clear that
defendant did accept the payments late and the proof rested solely on plaintiff's
testimony which defendant denied. On this point the court said:
Forfeitures are not favored in equity; and it is not our understanding
that proof of waiver of forfeiture must be so clear etc., as to leave no room
or reasonable ground for hesitancy on the part of the chancellor, as contended
by the defendants .... 48
The court found that since there had been a waiver, defendant could not stand on
the strict provisions of the contract. On this point the court said:
Even when time is of the essence of the contract the vendor may waive
the condition or requirement in that respect and he does so by receiving
payments after a default. Forfeitures are not favored and if the contract
does not provide for it or if time is of the essence but has been waived it
is necessary that the vendor give the vendee notice of his intention to forfeit
the contract before the vendee may be deprived of equitable relief against the
forfeiture. 49
The court also discussed the effect on the strict forfeiture provisions of improvements made on the land:
In addition to the acceptance of payments out of time and of lesser
amounts than due, the case involves improvements made by the vendees
with the vendors' knowledge and consent .... The vendors knew of the
necessity for the improvements. The improvements were of a permanent
nature and in furtherance of the use to which the vendors had devoted the
property ... the vendees produced records indicating expenditures totaling
$2,575.79 over the period involved. The improvements made by the vendees
were several times the amount due the vendors when the purchaser was
dispossessed. .

.

. The vendors' actions appear oppressive and with a view

50
to securing an unfair advantage under the letter of the contract.
This case would seem to indicate that even though the supreme court gives lip
service to the validity of forfeiture provisions, there may be situations in which
the court will relieve against the strict forfeiture provisions and grant specific
performance of the contract, if sought. 5 ' Other recent cases which have considered
52
this point seem to support this view.

48. Id. at 432-33, 283 S.W.2d at 613.
49. Id. at 433, 283 S.W.2d at 614.
50. Id. at 434, 283 S.W.2d at 615-16.
51. On the basis of Bogad v. Wachter, a court may not allow forfeiture: (1)
whenever vendor accepted payments late; (2) in a different amount than due;
(3) whenever the purchaser has made considerable improvements on the land; or (4)
if it appears that the vendor's actions in forcing strict forfeiture are oppressive and
with a view to securing an unfair advantage.
52. The usual statement is that if the contract provides for an express forfeiture,
that provision must be given effect. However the court will then normally find
there has been a waiver of the strict provisions. Since O'Fallen v. Kennerly, 45 Mo.
194 (1869), the courts have always been able to grant specific performance of his
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C. Purchaser's Right to Restitution of Payments
After Default Even Though Contract Expressly Provides for Forfeiture
A problem arises when the purchaser feels that the amount paid on the contract,
prior to default, is greater than the rental value of the property plus reasonable
damages for the breach, and sues for restitution of his payments. The court must
then decide whether to disregard the express provisions of the contract and give
relief to the purchaser, or deny restitution and thereby make the court a party to a
possible penalty.
This problem was first considered in Missouri in Burris v. Shrewsbury Park
Land & Improvement Co. 5 3 In that case the plaintiff and defendant entered into a
contract whereby defendant would convey to plaintiff certain real estate. The deed
was to be given to plaintiff when plaintiff had paid eleven installments of $10 each.
The contract further provided:
[I]t is agreed that, if the purchaser shall not faithfully comply with the
provisions of this contract, after the lapse of sixty days from such failure
54
this contract shall become null and void without notice ....
Plaintiff paid the first ten installments but defaulted on the eleventh. The defendant
immediately notified plaintiff that:
. . . unless he continued said payments, [defendant] would declare said
exhibit "A" [the contract] forfeited, and that all and singular and several
sums of money paid by him thereon would become the property of
[defendant] absolutely. 5 5
Plaintiff thereupon demanded defendant return his payments and on defendant's
refusal brought this action to recover the same. The court in determining the basis
of plaintiff's action said:
It is obvious that the respondent's [plaintiff's] action is predicated on
the assumption that the contract described in his petition was rescinded,
and that he was therefore entitled to recover back the money paid thereunder.5 6
Since there was no rescission of the contract, the plaintiff's relief was denied and
the vendor's forfeiture upheld. The court stated that the plaintiff would not be
entitled to rescind the contract as long as he was in default. The plaintiff was
thought to be in essentially the same position in seeking restitution as he would
have been had he sued for breach of contract. Thus the court said, "a party cannot
57
rescind, if the breach is occasioned by his own fault."

contract to the purchaser in default, despite the presence of strict provisions for
forfeiture. Rayburn v. Atkinson, 206 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1947); Parkhurst v. Lebanon
Publishing Co., 356 Mo. 934, 204 S.W.2d 214 (1947); Branch v. Lee, 159 S.W.2d 677
(Mo. 1941); Bammert v. Kenefick, 261 S.W. 78 (Mo. 1924); Randolph v. Ellis, 240
Mo. 216, 144 S.W. 483 (1912); Gray v. Gurley, 252 Mo. 410, 159 S.W. 1076 (1913).

53. 55 Mo. App. 381 (1893).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 384.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
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Even though the court made it clear an action for restitution of the payments
would not lie, there was dictum that weakened the case for the general proposition
that provisions for forfeiture extinguish a purchaser's equity when there is a
default in payment. This dictum indicates that if the plaintiff had sought specific
performance of the contract he, in all likelihood, would have been successful.
Only two other cases have been found where a Missouri court has considered
the problem of whether a defaulting purchaser under a land installment contract
can have restitution of his payments when the contract provides for forfeiture.
58
One of these is not in point for this discussion.
9
In Orr v. ZimmermanG the plaintiff was the assignee of a purchaser of 80 acres
of land under an installment contract which provided for strict forfeiture in case
of default. Under the assignment, the plaintiff's assignor, the original purchaser,
was to pay the contract price of the land left owing to the vendor, in discharge of
a debt owed the plaintiff. The defendant, a third party, induced the vendor to

declare a forfeiture under the terms of the contract on the basis of delinquency
in payments by the plaintiff's assignor. After the forfeiture, the vendor executed
a new installment contract with defendant and put defendant in possession. The
plaintiff then brought an action for restitution of payments already made by the
plaintiff's assignor and prayed that the land be sold to satisfy these payments. The
theory of plaintiff's action was that the vendor had waived the strict forfeiture provisions. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the vendor
could not stand on the strict forfeiture provisions after he had repeatedly waived
them by accepting late payments from plaintiff's assignor. The court, in announcing
its decision, used language which has often been repeated and is probably the cause
of much of the confusion in subsequent cases:
Although courts of equity, notwithstanding their abhorrence of forfeitures, will not interfere where the exaction is made for the protection
of the vendor, and under circumstances where a strictly legal right is fairly
claimed ... yet, where the right has been repeatedly waived, and valuable
improvements have been made . . . the sudden exaction of a forfeiture . . .
would not be very favorably viewed by a court of equity .... 60
It would seem apparent that on the basis of these cases, an attempt to anticipate
the exact result to be expected in Missouri when a defaulting purchaser seeks

58. In Doerner v. St. Louis Crematory and Mausoleum Co., 80 S.W.2d 721 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1935) the problem was raised, but restitution was denied because the
purchaser was clearly in default
59. 63 Mo. 72 (1876).
60. Id. at 77-78, citing Hansbrough v. Peck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 497 (1866), a
landmark case from Illinois, in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
forfeiture provisions in a land installment contract that cost the purchaser in
default upwards of $40,000. In that case the court said at 506-07:
[T]he party who has advanced money, or done an act in part-performance
of the agreement, and then stops short and refuses to proceed to its ultimate
conclusion, the other party being ready and willing to proceed and filfill all
stipulations according to the contract, will not be permitted to recover back
what has thus been advanced or done.
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restitution of installments would be very difficult. It is possible that the disposition
of Missouri courts on this question may have changed completely in the years that
62
61
There are two analogous contract
were decided.
have elapsed since these cases
situations which seem to offer a good indication of what might be the present
disposition of Missouri courts on penalties and forfeitures resulting from land installment contracts. The first is the conditional sale contract for chattels, where it is
required by statute that, before the vendor can retake possession after the purchaser's
default, there must be a refund of seventy-five per cent of the payments already
made. 6 3 The other situation involves the surplus, if any, after foreclosure of a
mortgage or deed of trust. Here the law is clear that after payment of expenses and
the mortgage debt the surplus must be returned to the holder of the equity of
64
redemption.
D. Vendor's Right to Possession After Purchaser'sDefault
Where Installment Contract Provides for Forfeiture of Payments
The most recent case to construe a land installment contract is Atkinson v.
65
Smothers. In that case plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract
wherein plaintiff agreed to sell defendant a piece of realty. Defendant was to pay
the purchase price in installments of $10 per month; upon full payment plaintiff
was to give defendant a deed to the property. By the terms of the contract, time
was to be of the essence and if defendant failed to make any payment when due or
within a fifteen day grace period, the plaintiff had the option to declare the contract
null and void and retain all payments as rent and liquidated damages. The defendant
defaulted on the contract and the plaintiff gave him notice to quit the premises as
provided in the forfeiture clause. When defendant refused to move, plaintiff brought
an action in ejectment. The defendant's answer admitted plaintiff was legal title
holder, but attempted to set up a superseding oral contract as an affirmative defense,
also asserting a counterclaim for plaintiff's breach of that contract. The court refused
the defendant's counterclaim for want of certainty and lack of proof. The court
granted the plaintiff's action of ejectment saying:
The principle is firmly established that where one goes into possession
under a contract of purchase, and then makes default in the payment of the

61. Orr v. Zimmerman, 63 Mo. 72 (1876); Burris v. Shrewsbury Park Land &
Improvement Co., 55 Mo. App. 381 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893).
62. See Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contract:II, 44 YALE L.J. 754, 776 (1935):
The doctrine that equity will enforce forfeiture provisions in land contracts where time is expressly made of the essence developed in this country
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, at a time when extreme ideas
as to 'freedom of contract' were influencing American judicial decisions in
every field . . . the courts were thinking in terms of free-willing individuals
entirely able to look after themselves rather than in terms... of a socialized
law taking a realistic account of inequalities of economic position and
bargaining power.
63. § 428.110, RSMo 1949.
64. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
65. 291 S.W.2d 645 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
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purchase price in accordance with the terms of the contract, he may be
turned out by the vendor in an action of ejectment. 66
The court seems to have overlooked the distinction that in the cases it cited
the forfeiture involved was only a down payment made to bind the agreement,
whereas in the contract before the court the provision was for forfeiture of the
payments made prior to default. It is submitted that a provision for retention by the
vendor of a down payment in case the purchaser fails to go through with a binder
agreement is well recognized as a fair measure of liquidated damages. However, in
the case of an instalment contract, where 'all payments are forfeited, it is more
difficult to say such a provision is a fair measure of liquidated damages. Considering
the extreme penalty possible when all payments are forfeited, it would seem highly
improbable that the court intended to apply the doctrine of the cases it cited as
strictly as indicated. It is more probable the court was considering the principal case
only in light of its own facts. Since those facts indicate the defendant defaulted on
the contract after making only eight $10 payments, there were no penalty consequences to warn of the distinction between forfeiture provisions for down payments and forfeiture provisions for installments of the total debt. On that basis the
case would seem rather weak for the proposition that forfeiture provisions in
installment contracts are to be accorded the same validity as liquidated damage
provisions in a binder contract.
The position of Missouri courts is further complicated by Parkhuratv. Lebanon
Publishing Co. 6 7 In that case the parties entered into an installment contract whereby
plaintiff was to sell to defendant a piece of real estate in Lebanon, Missouri. By the
contract, defendant was to pay the purchase price in monthly installments of $50 each,
a deed to be given when the total price was paid. In case of defendants's default the
contract gave the plaintiff the power to declare the contract null and void, retain all
payments and require defendant peacefully to surrender possession. The defendant
went into possession and paid the first two installments as provided in the contract.
However he overlooked payment of the third installment until seven days after
expiration of the fifteen day grace period. The plaintiff refused to accept this installment and invoked the strict provisions of the contract. When the defendant refused
to surrender possession, plaintiff brought an action for ejectment and defendant
counterclaimed for specific performance of the contract. The court refused plaintiff's
action of ejectment and granted defendant specific performance of the contract,
notwithstanding the default. The refusal of plaintiff's action of ejectment was
based on the fact that plaintiff had failed to "furnish" defendant with an abstract
as provided in the contract. Thus being in default himself, he could not invoke the
strict provisions of the contract in regard to defendant's delinquent payment.
On the issue of specific performance in favor of the defendant, the court took

66. Id. at 648, citing Waugh v. Williams, 342 Mo. 903, 119 S.W.2d 223 (1938);
Wright v. Lewis, 323 Mo. 404, 19 S.W.2d 287 (1929); Heller v. Jentzsch, 303 Mo.
440, 260 S.W. 979 (1924); De Barnardi v. McElroy, 110 Mo. 650, 19 S.W. 626 (1892).
67. 356 Mo. 934, 204 S.W.2d 241 (1947).
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the position that even though defendant was in default, this did not preclude the
remedy:
if the condition be subsequently performed, without unreasonable delay,
that would render it unjust or
and no circumstances have intervened
68
inequitable to give such relief.
The court noted that there were several factors in favor of defendant's specific
performance:
...

. . . 'judicial notice' that real estate values in and around Lebanon had
increased 'very materially' . . . [as motivation for plaintiff seeking to

terminate the contract]. The delay was unintentional and due to oversight,
inadvertence and mistake, under unusual facts to which the vicissitudes of
war and illness apparently contributed.6 9
The court added, "no facts appear which would make it unjust or inequitable to
70
grant the affirmative relief asked."
This case indicates the same tendency on the part of the court that seemed
to be present in the cases where the defaulting purchaser sought specific performance
in the first place. If there is anything present besides the strict forfeiture provision,
71
upon which the case can turn, that factor will decide the case. Here the court
grounded the refusal of plaintiff's ejectment action on his failure to "furnish" an
abstract in the manner provided in the contract. On close reading of the facts, that
is found to be very forced reasoning. The contract in effect provided that the
defendant was not required to pay any portion of the purchase price pending receipt
72
of the abstract and a reasonable opportunity to examine the same. The facts indi68. Id. at 944, 204 S.W.2d at 247.
69. Id. at 945, 204 S.W.2d at 247. The court said at 938, 204 S.W.2d at 242-43:
[While Fred W. May was in foreign service in the far East . .. Virginia B.
May, wife of Fred W. May, notified the plaintiff [Parkhurst] that the
defendant corporation [Lebanon Publishing Co.], of which she was acting
president, chose to ... buy the property ... and the said Virginia B. May...
inexperienced in business affairs . . . signed said contract on behalf of

defendant corporation.
70. Id. at 945, 204 S.W.2d at 248.
71. Gray v. Gurley, 252 Mo. 410, 159 S.W. 1076 (1913). In that case the plaintiff
sought to eject a defaulting purchaser who had held over on an installment contract
containing strict forfeiture provisions. The court refused plaintiff's remedy and
granted the defaulting purchaser specific performance of the contract on the basis
of "waiver" of the strict provisions by the plaintiff when he said "pay when you
can and it will be alright." There was the following dictum in the case at 421, 159
S.W. 1079:
It is true that poor people must comply with their contracts the same as
those who are more fortunately situated, but in forfeiting contracts for
nonperformance the situation of the parties and the degree of their intelligence should never be entirely ignored.
See also Tetley v. McElmurry, 201 Mo. 382, 392, 100 S.W. 37, 39 (1907), where plaintiff vendor was refused action of ejectment against purchaser in default because
the court found there had been no forfeiture as required in the contract. The court
said:
[A]s Tetley's right to possession grew out of a forfeiture, then, if the forfeiture be waived and become as though dead, the right to possession (an
incident) is dead also.
72. 356 Mo. at 943, 204 S.W.2d at 246.
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cated that plaintiff gave the abstract to defendant, who had it certified to date six
days after the contract was entered into. No reason was given why defendant did
not have the abstract examined nor was there any objection to payment of the first
three installments without having had it examined. Thus it would seem the court
was rather eager to find an excuse to refuse plaintiff his strict forfeiture rights,
since it would seem clear that defendant by making his payments without objection
waived the right to have plaintiff strictly comply with the abstract provision.
E. State of Title Where Purchaser Has Been Dispossessed
By Operationof Forfeiture Provisionin Land Installment Contract
The risk of impairment of title marketability is one of the most serious problems
that arises from the use of land installment contracts in Missouri. If there was any
certainty the Missouri courts would enforce the vendor's forfeiture provisions there
would be little problem with marketability of titles under land installment contracts.
However, in light of the small number of decisions on forfeiture provisions, and the
diversity of their results, any action the vendor takes under the contract, other than
court action, presents a threat to the marketability of the title to the property.
A case which illustrates what can happen to the title to land when a purchaser
is dispossessed and forfeited out under an installment contract is Price v. Rausche.73
In that case the plaintiff, purchaser under a land installment contract, brought an
action to quiet title against her vendor and a third party. The latter party had
purchased the land after the vendor had attempted to extinguish plaintiff's rights
by the forfeiture provisions in the contract. The court found that the vendor had
waived the right to declare a forfeiture by accepting plaintiff's payments after the
grace period. This was held binding on the subsequent purchaser of the land
since he purchased with knowledge of plaintiff's interest. This being the case, the
court ordered that upon payment of the remainder of the purchase price, title be
quieted in the plaintiff.
From this case and from the previous cases which indicate the willingness of
Missouri courts to grant specific performance to purchasers in default, it would
seem clear that it would be nearly impossible for a vendor to convey marketable
title 74 to land recovered from a prior purchaser who had defaulted on a land
installment contract,75 unless the subsequent vendee should happen to be an innocent
purchaser for value without notice of the first purchaser's interest.7 6

73. 186 S.W. 968 (Mo. 1916).
74. By marketable title is meant:
[T]he kind of title that would not only enable the record owner to hold his
land, but to hold it in peace and, if he wishes to sell the land, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will arise to disturb its market value.
Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Mo. 1956); accord, Ott v. Pickard, 361 Mo.
823, 237 S.W.2d 109 (1951); Thomas J. Johnson & Co. v. Muller, 356 Mo. 1109, 205
S.W.2d 521 (1947).
75. This statement assumes a situation where the vendor has not been able
to procure a quitclaim deed of the property from the defaulting first purchaser.
In many cases the quitclaim deed back will be the common practice since the pur-
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CONCLUSION

In Missouri the conventional deed of trust with power of foreclosure by nonjudicial sale will accomplish all of the favorable results sought in some jurisdictions

by the use of the land installment contract.
From the existing case law on the land installment contract it is apparent that,
if used in Missouri at all, it should be used with extreme caution and only after
all the possible unfavorable consequences have been given careful consideration.
In the cases to date the courts by failing to take careful stock of their language,
have failed to give a clear indication of the validity of a provision for strict
forfeiture of all payments in case of default inserted in a land installment contract.
The tendency would seem to be away from strictly enforcing the agreement of the
parties regardless of the consequences. Instead, the tendency seems to be in favor
of relief to the purchaser if a penalty seems imminent. But it should be kept in mind
that the nature of the action and the status of the moving party as vendor, vendee,
bona fide purchaser, and the like, may have an important bearing on the outcome
of these suits.
It would seem that the simplest and most desirable way for the courts to handle
the land installment contract with forfeiture provisions would be to utilize the
same principles that govern other contracts with liquidated damage provisions. In
a particular case, if it appears a serious penalty will result, the court should consider
the provision invalid and determine the actual damages sustained by the vendor
as a result of the default. The court would be under no greater hardship in assessing
damages than would have existed if the contract had contained no forfeiture provisions.
TERENCE C. PORTER

WHAT CONSTITUTES "FARM LABOR"
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF MISSOURI
One of the significant features that most workmen's compensation laws in the
United States have in common is the exclusion of farm or agricultural workers from

chaser wants to get out from under the whole situation and does not desire to
avoid the forfeiture provision or is not aware that it is remotely possible to do so.
In some cases the purchaser will be required to execute a quitclaim deed to be
placed in escrow at the time the installment contract is entered into. This protects
the vendor against the possibility that the purchaser will refuse to do so after default
and forfeiture. However, the recorded quitclaim deed itself may suggest some
possible outstanding equity.
76. It has been suggested that in a situation where the land conveyed is to be
unoccupied and the contract is not to be put of record, the land installment contract
can be used without fear of clouding title. If the purchaser defaults, the vendor
can exercise the forfeiture provision and sell to a bona fide purchaser thereby
cutting off the prior defaulting purchaser's equity. This should be particularly
expedient, as mentioned in note 36 supra, in a speculative sub-division venture
where the value of the lots is so small that even the very inexpensive foreclosure
of a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale would not be feasible.
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compulsory coverage.1 It would seem that this is largely an American innovation in
the field of workmen's compensation, as no similar exclusion is found in the compensation acts of the more important European countries.2 However, some of our
legislatures have included agricultural workers employed in the use of heavy
machinery or power equipment, or have provided an election for agricultural workers
to come under the protection of the act. One writer tells us that in actual practice
many of those who hire sizable numbers of farm laborers have found it necessary to
carry compensation insurance for their own economic protection.8
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the pertinent section of the Missouri
workmen's compensation act and the cases construing that section. No attempt will
be made to cover the many differing statutes and cases of other jurisdictions, except
as they have been cited and applied by Missouri courts or where they materially aid
our undertaking of the Missouri situation.
In Missouri the applicable provision is section 287.090, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949), which provides:
1. ...

[T]his chapter shall not apply to ...

(2) Employments of farm labor.

Various suggestions have been made from time to time as to the reason why
such an exclusion should have been made by the legislatures enacting workmen's
compensation laws. One reason commonly accepted is that "the farm industry is
perhaps less able than others to add the cost of compensation insurance to the market
price of its product and pass it on to the consumer because that price is as a rule
fixed by those in control of distant markets, and is perhaps also more quickly
affected by the law of supply and demand than the products of most other
industries." 4 Larson rather effectively demolishes this argument when he points out:
This might be true if an isolated state attempted compulsory coverage, but if
all states extended coverage to farm labor, there would be no competitive
disadvantage so far as the domestic market is concerned. As to the disparity
between the domestic and world market, that problem already exists, and
will not become essentially different because of a slight change in one
domestic agricultural cost factor. 5
Another reason sometimes set forth to support the exemption is that inclusion of
farm workers would throw unreasonable accounting and record-keeping burdens upon
the small farmer.6 However, the compulsory compensation acts usually differentiate
between so-called "major" and "minor" employers, compelling compensation only as
to "major" employers.7 It is evident that any farmer qualifying as a "major
1. See, e.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves of 1953, ch. 656, § 1. Ohio, Orno REV. CODE
ANN. § 4123.01 (Baldwin 1958), and Vermont, VT. STAT. §§ 8070-75 (1947), do not
recognize this exemption.
2. 1 LamoN, WoluIN's COMPENSATION § 53.00 (1952); 2 ScHNEIDER, WorxuMeN's
C6- PmNSATION § 628 (3d. ed. 1942).
3. 1 LARSON, op. cit. 8upra note 2, § 53.10.
4. 2 ScHNinza, op. cit. supra note 2, § 628, at 615.
5. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 53.20.
6. Ibid.
7. See § 287.050, RSMo 1949 (defining a "major employer" as one having more
than ten regular employees).
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employer" necessarily will have an adequate accounting and record-keeping system
already established for income taxation purposes. The presence of the "farm labor"
exclusion in our law thus allows the large dairy, truck, and cattle farms to escape
one of the responsibilities of industry.
However, the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Bear, a decision
applying the factory acts, put its finger on the true reason for statutes of this type
in Missouri, if not in a large part of the nation, when it said:
*. . our Legislature, containing at all Times among its membership a large
contingent of rural representatives as well as urban members, well understood the marked distinction between an industrial or merchantile enterprise
and the pursuit of agriculture, and never intended or designed the factory act
for application to the farm. Certain other laws indicate this distinction. The
Workmen's Compensation Act, section 3303, Rev. St. 1929, separates the farm
laborer from industrial workers, and expressly excludes "employments of
farm labor." The statute prescribing that eight hours shall constitute a day's
work does not apply to farm labor. Section 13205, Rev. St. 1929. And likewise,
the statute designed to protect working children does not apply to agricultural labor. Section 14084, Rev. St. 1929. There may be other instances. These
existing in the
indicate a legislative policy which recognizes the distinction
8
condition of the farm labor and the industrial employee.
At the time most of our compensation laws were enacted, the population was still
predominantly rural, resulting as the court points out, in a large number of rural
legislators. While we do not like to admit the possibility, it may have been that the
"farm labor" exclusion was a political necessity to prevent defeat of the proposed bill,
both in the legislature and upon referendum. In this connnection, one writer has
stated, "The exclusion of farm labor was perhaps more on legislative expedience than
upon sound reason." 9
The Missouri statutes and cases do not give an original definition of the term
"farm labor." However, the following examples of language adopted by the Missouri
courts can serve as an introduction to the basic problem of defining the exclusion:
The growing of grass and grain and the raising and care of stock are the
ordinary uses to which a farm is put, and the work of raising, tilling, and
10
harvesting the grain and caring for the stock is ordinarily farm labor.
All the multifarious work of operating a farm must be done by somebody; and who is to do it except the farm laborer? It is, of course, necessary
to keep the farm machinery in repair-the reapers, mowers, corn harvesters,
sulky plows, wagons, harnesses, etc. It is just as necessary to keep the farm
buildings in repair, and occasionally to make small additions to them. This is
a part of the routine work of the farm laborer; just as much so as milking the
cows, cleaning off the horses, building fences, putting a new point on the
plow, doctoring a sick horse, butchering the hogs, greasing the wagons,

8. 225 Mo. App. 1097, 1103, 40 S.W.2d 481, 485 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
9. 2 ScHnIER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 628, at 615.
10. Plemmons v. Pevely Dairy Co., 241 Mo. App. 659, 665, 233 S.W.2d 426, 429
(St. L. Ct. App. 1950), quoting Shafer v. Parke, Davis & Co., 192 Mich. 577, 581, 159
N.W. 304, 305 (1916).
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assisting the threshers, driving the team to market, and innumerable other
familiar duties. 11
[T]he commission rightly ... attempted to distinguish the common and
ordinary significance of the terms "farm" and "farm labor" from the
specialized meanings thereof when, in exceptional and rare instances, the use
of the word "farm" is extended to embrace such areas as a worm, rattlesnake, crocodile or even oyster farm. These instances clearly are not within
the common and ordinary usage of the term "farm."12
Some of the cases prefer to speak of "farm laborers" rather than "farm labor," but
are in general agreement with the view that "any man employed to work on a farm,
and to perform the work ordinarily done there, is a farm laborer."13
Most of the cases on the subject have avoided any definition of the term
"farm labor." The courts are usually content merely to examine the facts of the
particular case and pronounce that the employment involved therein was or was not
farm labor according to the general meaning of the term. However, the judges are
not alone in this tendency as most of the text writers have followed the lead of the
cases in this respect.
The courts have, however, recognized a very real difference between the two
terms "agricultural employment" and "farm labor." This distinction was first
recognized in Missouri in St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Comre'n, in which the court was construing a provision of the unemployment compensation law excluding "agricultural labor." The court stated:
It is true that the word agriculture usually covers all things done by a
farmer or on a farm. [citing cases] But agriculture is more comprehensive
than farming. In its broader sense it applies as well to horticulture in a
garden or nursery.... This statement is supported by the accepted definitions
of agriculture as the term is commonly understood....
In order to sustain the Commission's contention it would be necessary for
us to substitute the term "farm labor," a narrower classification, for "agricultural labor" or to write into the law that only such agricultural labor as is
performed on a farm is exempt. This we may not do. In view of the commonly understood meaning of the term the legislature would have included
such a restriction had it intended one. 14
This distinction was directly applied to the field of workmen's compensation by
the Supreme Court of Missouri in Dost v. Pevety Dairy Co., where the court said:

11. Cloughly v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.W.2d 961, 967 (Mo. 1951), quoting
Coleman v. Bartholomew, 175 App. Div. 122, 124, 161 N.Y. Supp. 560, 561 (1916).
12. Dost v. Pevely Dairy Co., 273 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Mo. 1954), quoting Cedarburg
Fox Farms v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 604, 610, 6 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1942).
13. Shafer v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 10.
14. 348 Mo. 1153, 1156, 159 S.W.2d 249, 250 (1941). This distinction was also
applied in Damutz v. William Pinchbeck, Inc., 158 F.2d 882, 883 (2d Cir. 1946), concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act which excepted "any employee engaged in
agriculture." That act contained a definition of agriculture which the opinion states
covers ".... much more than what might be called ordinary farming activity."
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Our Legislature has used the narrower classification "farm labor" in
the Workmen's Compensation Act instead of the more inclusive term "agricultural labor" and we must assume that it did not mean to exclude from
its benefits all of those who could be included in a broad construction of
the broader term. Sec. 287.800 states that the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act shall be liberally construed with a view of the public
welfare. This has been interpreted to mean that the Act should be construed "with a liberality calculated to effectuate its purpose and so to
extend its benefits to the largest possible class and restrict those excluded to
the smallest possible class." [citing cases] . . . It is our view that our
Legislature meant to use the term "farm labor" in its ordinary and customary
usage and did not intend to exclude from the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Act all of those who could be included in the broadest scope
of the term "agriculture." We think this intent appears from the restricted
wording of See. 287.090 and from the Workmen's Compensation Act considered as a whole.15
Significant of the changing times and the rise of so-called industrial farming
is the fact that some twenty-five years elapsed between the passage of the workmen's
compensation law in Missouri containing the "farm labor" exclusion and the first
case applying that particular provision. This case was Plemmons v. Pevely Dairy
Co.,16 argued before the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1950. The deceased worker
was employed on defendant's farm, and it was stipulated that his duties were: "the
care and breeding of the cows on the farm, particularly the care of the dry cows,
care of such cows when calving, care of the calves, in barns and fields, the mixing
of feed and the feeding of dry cows and calves."'17 Death came as a result of a
goring by a bull from the herd. The court held that the employment was clearly
one of farm labor, laying down the rule, after a review of cases from other jurisdictions, that "it is the character of the work itself, and not the business of the
employer, that is determinative."' 8 Therefore, not everyone who works on a farm
is a farm laborer. Certainly a bookkeeper, secretary, or tax consultant employed
by a large industrial farm could not be classified as a farm laborer. 19
Unfortunately, as is so often the case when a short and concise rule of law is
attempted by the courts, some confusion with regard to excursions into or out of
farm labor was created by the Plemmons case. The court quoted with approval
the following language:
'Whether a laborer is or is not a farm employee is determined from the
character of the work he is required to perform.' This rule is properly interpreted in Peterson v. Farmers' State Bank, 180 Minn. 40, 230 N.W. 124 by
the holding: 'Neither the pending task nor the place where it is being
performed is the test. The whole character of the employment must be
looked to, to determine whether he is a farm laborer. That is what is
meant by the statement that it is "the character of the work which the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
(1944).

273 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Mo. 1954).
241 Mo. App. 659, 233 S.W.2d 426 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950).
Id. at 663, 233 S.W.2d at 427.
Id. at 663, 233 S.W.2d at 428.
Hoaovrrz, IxJuay AND DEATH UNDER Woax mEN's COMPENSATION LAws 222
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employee is hired to perform, which is the test of whether the employee
is a farm laborer.' (Emphasis added.)20
The Plemmons opinion did not elaborate on the inconsistency between work required
and work hired to perform. Thus some uncertainty remained as to whether farm
labor was to be determined from the work being done at the time of the injury or
the work the employee was hired to do.
In 1954, the case of McCaleb v. Greer, 21 came before the Springfield Court of
Appeals. In that case, the employer was engaged in the general real estate business
and also operated several guest homes. Claimant was her general manager and
supervisor of both businesses. In the course of her real estate operations, employer
purchased a farm upon which was kept some livestock, although no one lived on
the farm. Claimant also supervised and managed this farm, hiring local help to
feed the stock, build fences and do other work. It was shown that claimant would
go out to the farm every week to bring feed for the stock, as well as other supplies
and material, and sometimes would stay overnight in the house on the farm in
order to supervise the help. At the time of the accident, claimant was on the farm,
had checked work to be done, had paid for completed work, had checked the
stock, and was reviewing his duties in his mind when he slipped, fell, and broke his
leg.
The court enumerated the general rule of the Plemmons case that "it is the
character of the work itself, and not the business of the employer, that is determinative" 22 and proceeded to say:
Since the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Plemmons v.
Pevely Dairy Co., supra, the Supreme Court has passed upon the question
in issue in Cloughly v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., Mo. Sup. 243 S.W.2d 961, 964, 965.
...We must follow the law as last decided by our Supreme Court and
we think that that rule of law is definitely stated in the above cited case
as follows on page 965:
'It may be first observed that the test which must be applied is, could
a jury reasonably infer that Swantner was reasonably engaged in the
general business covered by the [insurance] policy, or, was his work
incident to or connected with the operation of plaintiff's farm. In applying
that test it must be kept in mind that under this [insurance] policy it is the
character and purpose of the work Swantner performed, and neither the
place of its performance nor the previous calling of the performer, that is
23
determinative.'
After quoting this language from the Cloughly case, the court of appeals stated:
The controlling principle in this case must be, was claimant engaged in
doing such acts at the time of his injury that are usually performed in the
24
operation of farms.
20. 241 Mo. App. at 669, 233 S.W.2d at 431, quoting Dowery v. State, 84 Ind.
App. 37, 39, 149 N.E. 922, 923 (1925).
21. 241 Mo. App. 736, 267 S.W.2d 54 (Spr. Ct. App. 1954).
22. 241 Mo. App. at 663, 233 S.W.2d at 428.
23. 241 Mo. App. at 747, 748, 267 S.W.2d at 60, 62.
24. Id. at 749, 267 S.W.2d at 62.
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The decision reached was that claimant was engaged in farm labor at the time of
his injury and was within the statutory exclusion.
It is difficult to see just where the court obtained the principle that the acts
at the time of the injury governed the determination whether claimant was engaged
in an employment of farm labor. It can readily be seen from the quoted portions
of the Cloughly case, above, as well as from an examination of the case itself, that
no such rule or principle was laid down. Indeed, it is difficult in retrospect to see
how the court of appeals could rely upon the Cloughly case as precedent. As the
supreme court pointed out at a later date in Dost v. Pevely Dairy Co.:
The Cloughly case did not involve a construction of our Workmen's
Compensation Act but was based on the construction of a provision of an
insurance policy, which insured against loss not covered by the Act as well
as liability under it. This was a very broad provision including 'all operations
necessary, incident and appurtenant' to the insured's business operations
described (covering repairs and alterations on his farms among other
things) 'whether such operations are conducted at the work places defined
and described [the farms] ... or elsewhere in connection with, or in relation
to, such work places.' [243 S.W.2d 962.] This case is not helpful in construing
the provision of our Workmen's Compensation Act herein involved. 25
According to the facts of the Cloughly case, plaintiff was injured while salvaging
lumber from a wrecked building in St. Louis, preparatory to taking the lumber to
the employer's farm. If such a rule had been laid down in the case, as claimed
by the McCaleb decision, the Cloughly case would have found no farm labor since
the acts that claimant was doing at the time of the injury were those of a salvager
of materials and not of a farmer.
Since no other similar language is to be found in the Cloughly or McCaleb cases,
the court of appeals apparently obtained its "principle" from the following language
quoted in its own opinion from a Maryland supreme court opinion:
.... "Farm laborers" . . . shall mean any employees who, at the time of
the accident, are engaged in rendering any agricultural service'. ... 26

When it took this language out of context, the court of appeals evidently overlooked
the fact that the quoted language was not the opinion of the Maryland court, but
a part of the Maryland workmen's compensation law, explanatory of the term "farm
laborers," and that no similar provision appears in the Missouri statute.
It should also be pointed out that, from the decision in the McCaleb case, it is
evident the court of appeals disregarded the testimony that claimant was general
manager and supervisor of all the employer's business, since they considered his
supervisory work in the farm as entirely separate from his other duties and used
this work only as determinative of his status as a "farm laborer."
Fortunately, Dost v. Pevely Dairy Co.27 partially removed the general confusion
caused by the Plemmons and McCaleb decisions. By holding that the Cloughly case

25. 273 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Mo. 1954).
26. 241 Mo. App. at 747, 267 S.W.2d at 60.
27. 273 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. 1954).
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was not applicable to the workmen's compensation law, the court cast considerable
doubt upon the validity of the McCaleb decision, although distinguishing it upon the
facts. The Dost case did not involve diversions to or from farm labor, but rather,
whether greenhouse work constituted farm labor. Thus there was no occasion to
clarify completely the rule laid down in the Plemmons case, other than to hold that
the decision was correct.
After some seven years of misunderstanding as to the test of "farm labor"
regarding excursions into and out of the usual work, the Springfield Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in Davis v. McKinney28 which appears to have
set the matter at rest. The facts of the case show that claimant was castrating a
bull calf on Paul McKinney's farm when the calf kicked the knife into claimant's
left hand, inflicting the injuries complained of. It was pointed out rather humorously that claimant was "sort of an expert" at this operation he was performing
"1as 'a common favor' to Paul, albeit not to the bulls." Defendant testified that it
"was just a simple occurrence (again from the standpoint of the human actors
but not the surgical subjects) for which claimant neither sought nor received
compensation." 29 The court, familiar with the ways of the people of the Ozarks,
assumed that there was an employer-employee relationship at the time of the
injury and then stated:
It is settled that whether an employee is or is not engaged in farm labor
is to be determined from the character of work he is required to perform.
We recognize that, in proper interpretation and application of the principle:
'Neither the pending task nor the place where it is being performed is the
test. The whole character of the employment must be looked to to determine
30
whether he is a farm laborer.'
It would appear that this statement recognizing the work "hired to perform" test,
quiets the confusion which has reigned since the Plemmons decision.
In addition to his farm, McKinney also had a sales barn, and there was some
evidence that he intended to hire claimant in the future in connection with the
sales barn operation. However, the court said, "the rights of the parties are to be
determined on the basis of the relationship actually existing when claimant was
injured." 3 1 The court seemed to feel that if there was any employment relation,
it was for the particular job of castrating the bulls and that it was not a continuing
relationship. In connection with the sales barn operation, the court further pointed
out:
Under some circumstances and in some employments, the care of livestock is not farm labor; and, if instant claimant's work at the time of his
injury had been in connection with the sale barn operation, regarded by
Paul as "a business enterprise" rather than a "farm operation" it may be
conceded that claimant would have been under the Compensation Law. But,
32
the care of livestock on a farm usually is farm labor.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

303 S.W.2d 189 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).
Id. at 191, 192.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
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In view of the other language used by the decision, it would appear that the above
quoted material refers to the whole character of claimant's work at the time of his
injury.
It is also interesting that the court pointed out, "any attempt to classify an
employee's labor on the basis of the intended use or disposition of the produce or
stock with which he is working would lead to hopeless, unspeakable confusion. ' 3 3
Thus, the Missouri law on excursions into or out of "farm labor" appears to be
that the whole character of the employment is to be looked to, ie., the work, and
all of the work, that the employee is hired to do, and not just the particular task
that is being performed at the time of the injury.
SUMMARY
Horovitz suggests four things which must "combine before the farm labor exclusion is effective, and the failure of any one to exist may be fatal to the exclusion:
(1) that the employer be a farmer as distinguished from any other occupation; (2)
that there be a farm; (3) that the injured worker be a farm laborer; and (4) that
the injury occur during farm operations on that farm."3 4
It readily can be seen that the Missouri law does not coincide with this statement.
Naturally, no one will deny that there must be a farm involved and that a farm
laborer must be injured. However, the Plemmons case specifically states that the
employer's occupation is not determinative of whether the employee is a farm
laborer. 3 5 Likewise, when the test is applied as to the whole character of the employment, it is apparent that an occasional excursion into or out of farm labor
does not constitute a covered employee a farm laborer, or change a farm laborer
to a covered worker. The excursion is "disregarded when the employee by virtue
of his regular employment has status as either a covered or exempt employee." 36
As Larson points out: "it is impractical to construe the act in such a way that
employees and employers dart in and out of coverage with every momentary change
in activity." 3 7 Thus, a worker normally covered by the workmen's compensation law,
who is sent to do jobs on a farm at odd intervals does not become a farm laborer,
but retains the status originally determined by his general employment, whether he
be carpenter, plumber or mechanic. 3 8 Conversely, one normally engaged in farm
labor does not suddenly come under the coverage of the act simply because he is
assigned to a certain task not to be performed on the farm. It is to be noted, however,
that if the deviations from the general employment become substantial, the nature
of the general employment may be changed, thus changing the employees's status
under the compensation law.
R. C. FIELDS
33.
34.
(1944).
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 193.
HoRoviTz, INzuRY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 217
241 Mo. App. 659, 663, 233 S.W.2d 426, 428 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 53.00 (1952).
Id. at § 53.40.
HoRovrrz, op. cit. supra note 34, at 222.
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